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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EQUALIZATION TRANSFER
UNDER A DECENTRALIZED CONTEXT: THE CASE OF PERUVIAN
MUNICIPALITIES
BY
LINDA JANET PORRAS-MENDOZA
MAY, 2018

Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Major Department: Public Management and Policy

This dissertation consists of two essays that examine the efficiency and equity
implications of a particular fiscal decentralization system. Both essays have the Peruvian
local governments as their unit of analysis.
The first essay investigates how accountability takes place in local governments in a
decentralized context. Accountability can refer to different concepts. In this essay we focus
on the effects of fiscal and policy variables on electoral outcomes. Theoretically, one of the
benefits of decentralization is the higher accountability that arises when subnational
governments are responsible for providing goods and services in their jurisdictions and
when they finance those goods and services with their own revenues. It is expected that this
framework will increase the interest of citizens in the performance of their elected
authorities, as well as the concern of elected authorities in their performance motivated by
their expectations of being reelected or being revoked.
The second essay examines the nature of fiscal disparities among local governments
under a decentralized context and the role played by equalization transfers. One of the

challenges in a decentralized context is to determine a transfer system with equity criteria;
meaning giving support to those jurisdictions that have low fiscal capacity and higher
expenditure needs, but without discouraging them to generate their own revenues or incur
into excessive spending. An important task to deal with this challenge is finding the right
measures of fiscal capacity and expenditure needs, and setting guidelines for how to include
them in the transfer system formula. The effect of including fiscal capacity and expenditure
needs measures in the design of equalization transfers could provide a strategy to reduce
existing fiscal disparities. We propose an alternative allocation methodology that includes a
measure of fiscal capacity in the current Peruvian equalization transfer and compare it with
the current formula by identifying the changes in the disparities before and after the
proposed reform.
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INTRODUCTION
The expression “One size fits all?” has frequently been used to question the risks of
generalizing policies across countries. It is the constant reminder that policies need to adjust
to the political and social context of the unit of analysis. Our interest in this dissertation is
on fiscal decentralization, which is one of those cases where adjustment to the political and
social context is of special importance.
The main goal pursued with fiscal decentralization is to improve efficiency in the
provision of public goods by transferring power to lower levels of government and to
citizens. The outcome of improved efficiency depends critically on local government
officials being more accountable to citizens in the provision of local services than central
authorities. That is, the expectation that citizens will care and react to government’s actions
and that in turn, governments will strive harder to satisfy the needs and preferences of
citizens.
And yet local government accountability is a subject that has been extensively studied,
but with largely inconclusive results. In large measure the problem lies in that the concept of
accountability itself is viewed differently comprising different kinds of institutions and
strategies. Most importantly, there is still a lack of a general framework that can be used to
test or predict the impact or influence of accountability on important processes and policies,
including fiscal decentralization.
Another potential reason for the diversity of results in the case of the role played by
accountability on fiscal decentralization outcomes comes from the methodological
limitations of studies using across countries panel data. These studies allow us to test
general aspects of the structure of the general government. But they are limited in what
economic variables can be used to measure outcomes because the necessary information
1

does not exist at a sufficient disaggregated level. Also, cross country studies are limited in
how much they can say about the dynamic changes that take place in a country when a
policy such as decentralization is implemented. Specific single country studies can offer a
rich alternative to disentangle the interaction between accountability and decentralization
outcomes.
A second important goal pursued with fiscal decentralization is to increase equality for
access to public service delivery among residents of different subnational units. Here the
main difficulty typically lies in the measurement of the expenditure needs and revenue
capacity of the subnational governments. Here again “one size may not fit all” because
countries differ very significantly in geographic conditions, developments levels or
abundance and distribution of natural resources across subnational units. And even though
much useful work has been done on the issues of how best equalize across subnational units
using cross country data, it is again the case that more can be learned by using disaggregated
data for specific country case studies, especially if those countries are characterized by
significant diversity among subnational governments.
In this dissertation we study the two issues of: (i) how decentralization, reflected in the
share of expenses financed with local revenues and policy outcomes, affects electoral
outcomes and (ii) how best design interjurisdictional equalization mechanisms in the
presence of considerable subnational diversity, by using data from Peru. The reasons why is
interesting to study a country like Peru are twofold: First, decentralization and electoral
accountability mechanisms have been well established at all subnational levels (regional and
local). Second, Peru shows a great diversity of conditions across local jurisdictions. This
diversity comes from its complex geography, the extremely uneven distribution of
significant endowments of natural resources, and from an administrative structure that is
2

characterized by a great level fragmentation. In this study we focus on local governments –
as opposed to regional governments -- since they have received more responsibilities and
revenue resources, and the one level that has more significantly used the existing
accountability mechanisms.
Both papers seek to contribute to the practice of decentralization. We hope that the
study of these two main sets of issues -the role of decentralization in accountability and how
to equalize resources in the presence of great subnational diversity- will shed light on these
issues and provide insight that will be useful to academic researchers and policymakers.

3

1
1.1

Electoral accountability under a decentralized context
Introduction
The discussion about fiscal decentralization and accountability has been vast: from their

definitions, the factors that influence their success, among others. However, despite the
amount of research, there are still issues concerning both decentralization and accountability
that require further clarification. In the case of fiscal decentralization, there has been a lot of
discussion about the criteria to assigned expenditure responsibilities among levels of
governments, but there is still a lack of a general theory of revenue assignments, which in turn
affects the types of accountability mechanisms available. In the case of accountability, several
mechanisms have been promoted with the expectation that they will enhance public policy and
administration decisions by allowing citizens to take an active role in shaping actual policies.
But it remains unclear how the effectiveness of these mechanisms can be measured.
More important to us in this essay, there are still questions about how the two constructs
of fiscal decentralization and accountability relate to each other. Considering the complexity of
fiscal decentralization and accountability, it is important to set the scope of our analysis. In the
case of decentralization, the essay focuses on the role played by intergovernmental transfers by
testing the impact of fiscal and policy variables on electoral outcomes. In the case of
accountability, we focus on two types of accountability mechanism that takes place through
the electoral system. Understanding the dynamic between fiscal and policy variables with
electoral outcomes have mostly been the focus on the central level of government, our essay
contributes to the literature by investigating these processes among local governments.
The structure of this essay is as follows. Section 1.2 presents the literature review and the
testable hypotheses used in our empirical analysis. Section 1.3 describes the main
characteristics of Peruvian local governments. Section 1.4 describes the data and the empirical
methodology. Section 1.6 presents the results. Section 1.7 concludes.
4

1.2

Review of the literature and the basic theoretical framework

1.2.1 Electoral Accountability
Accountability institutions aim to improve the efficiency of public spending by
encouraging public officials to design and deliver public services according to the demands
and needs of their citizens, and by giving citizens a role in the decision-making process.1 Its
importance, as described by Bovens (2005), relies on the role it plays in enhancing the
legitimacy of public governance by allowing democratic control and improving government
performance. The focus of our essay is the accountability that takes place through the electoral
system (electoral accountability).2
The literature uses different approaches to define the presence of electoral accountability.
Some scholars consider the reelection (or no reelection) of elected public officials, based on
their performance, as evidence of accountability.3 Others consider that any form of reward or
punishment regarding electoral outcomes is a sufficient indicator of accountability.4 We
consider the former approach to define electoral accountability.
Elections are not the only mechanism of direct democracy that allows voters to express
approval or disapproval of government performance.5 Direct recalls allow a specified number
of citizens to demand a vote for the electorate on whether elected officials should be removed
from office before the end of their term. There are similarities between elections and recalls;

1

The term accountability can refer to different concepts: the type of compliance; the mechanism set to enforce
compliance; the expected outcomes and citizens reaction to government performance (Rubin, 1996).
2
In this essay, we use the term “Electoral Accountability” and “Accountability'’ indistinctly and we take the
outcome of reelection and revoked as measures of accountability.
3
Seabright (1996) defines accountability as the probability that a region will be able to choose to elect or reject a
government purely according to its own view of the government's performance.
4
Samuels (2010) considered different measures of electoral accountability: change in vote share for the incumbent
party; change in seat share of the incumbent party; change in government status, if the incumbent party retains
control of the executive; and, change in partisan control of the national executive. Gélineau (2013) used, as a
measure of economic vote, the individual evaluations of the incumbent and vote intention for the incumbent party.
Previously they used the percentage vote received in the subnational election by the President's party (Gélineau &
Remmer, 2006). Other studies used citizens' perceptions of government (Escobar‐Lemmon & Ross, 2014).
5
Direct democracy is the decision making process in which the vote of citizens has a direct influence on the
contents of laws. It includes a broad range of different institutional mechanisms, such as referendum, plebiscites,
recalls, or popular initiatives (Altman, 2002; Feld & Savioz, 1997).

5

they are both regularized means for citizens to reward or sanction elected public officials
(Timmons & Garfias, 2015). However, recalls allow to remove elected representatives before
the end of their regular term and voters are in charge of collecting the signatures to initiate the
recall process. Its activation is expected to be more frequent in contexts of political distrust in
the government’s performance (Bowler, 2004).
Some of the theoretical frameworks used to study electoral accountability are the
principal-agent problem and the economic voting theory. According to the principal-agent
problem, the principal (voters) delegates to the agent (elected officials) a set of instruments to
execute certain goals. The problem arises because the interests of the principal and the agent
may be different, which can create inefficiencies and corruption (Adsera, Boix, & Payne,
2003).6 In the context of economic voting theory, voters punish or reward incumbent parties
and public officials for their relative success in managing the economy through their vote
(Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2011). Elections should make public officials accountable to the
public and the threat of losing office in the next period compels public officials to deliver good
services and refrain from extracting rents (Barro, 1973).7
However, comparative politics scholars have repeatedly found substantial variation in
economic voting across countries, over time, and even within countries over time. There are
empirical findings that show how voters make choices including factors beyond the
governments’ performance (Carlin & Singh, 2015). Voters could fail to impose sanctions
because they do not have the resources or skills to evaluate the performance of public officials
or to properly assign the responsibility (Anderson, 2007; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006). There

6

Elected officials may be interested in pursuing their own agenda like enriching themselves while in office; or,
even if they are honest, providing goods and services that differ from what the public wants.
7
The process of the individual vote choice is determined by the retrospective and prospective evaluation of
candidates; and, the voter's party identification (Stein, 1990). In the retrospective evaluation, citizens examine
whether the state of the world has improved under the elected public official's watch, and vote accordingly. In the
prospective evaluation, voters’ beliefs about the future performance of the economy influence their vote.
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is also the case that what is perceived as voters’ active role it actually reflects political
instability or power of the local elites (Bardhan, 2002).
There are also concerns about the effectiveness of the accountability mechanisms. Even
though elections and recalls are important control mechanisms, they may not be sufficient to
cause improved accountability (Ackerman, 2004).8 Other factors that can influence
accountability are the characteristics of the electoral system, political regime and political
parties (Eaton & Schroeder, 2010).9 In the particular case of the recall, some considered it
ineffective and that one of the outcomes of recall elections has often been the paradoxical one
that the incumbent has been strengthened (Qvortrup, 2011). In this essay we test if government
performance and the funding sources have a role in the probability of Mayors of being revoked
or reelected after controlling for other factors that could affect voters’ choices. The next
section explains the argument of why funding sources could affect electoral outcomes.
1.2.2 Fiscal Decentralization
The term decentralization refers to the transfer of authority and responsibilities from the
central to subnational governments.10 Decentralization as a policy includes political,
administrative and fiscal aspects.11 The literature of decentralization has evolved from the
discussion of the allocation of competencies across levels of governments (first-generation
theory) to an analysis that incorporates the role of institutions and public officials’ incentives
(second-generation theory). Under the first-generation theory of fiscal federalism, the
devolution of tax and expenditure authority to lower levels of government yields greater public
sector efficiency and elected public officials are considered benevolent maximizers of the

8

Elections and recalls only hold accountable elected officials, leaving out appointed bureaucrats.
Local elections are more likely to succeed in creating accountable governments if they are competitive and voters
judge candidates on their ability to provide services. If elections were not competitive, this would be an argument
against decentralization (Schmitter & Karl, 1991).
10
Based on its legal status, the decentralization can refer to the deconcentration; delegation; or, devolution of local
autonomy (Rondinelli, McCullough, & Johnson, 1989).
11
The political aspect aims to promote political representation and stability; the administrative aspect aims to
improve the technical efficiency; and, the fiscal aspect aims to improve the delivery of public services.
9
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social welfare.12 The second generation theory of fiscal federalism builds on the first
generation theory, but it also incorporates a public choice and political economy perspective,
and the problems of information (Oates, 2005). It focuses on the incentive effects of different
intergovernmental arrangements (Barry R Weingast, 1995).13
Many countries have sought decentralization as a mean to achieve a more efﬁcient public
sector (Martinez‐Vazquez et al., 2017). There is also the argument that decentralization might
reduce corruption because there is greater interjurisdictional competition (Arikan, 2004).
However, even if interjurisdictional competition motivates public officials to behave honestly,
it does not necessarily mean they have the capacity to do so (Fan, Lin, & Treisman, 2009).
On the issue of how the decentralized responsibilities should be financed, the first
generation literature theorized that revenue generation at the subnational level should follow
the benefit principle.14 The benefits of providing revenue autonomy are that subnational
governments can address their vertical imbalances.15 Without revenue autonomy there cannot
be discretion as regards to the level of expenditure; and, revenue autonomy is a key indicator
of subnational governments’ borrowing capacity and creditworthiness (Bahl & MartinezVazquez, 2013).
The second generation literature emphasizes the importance of revenue autonomy due to
its link to accountability. It addresses the influence of the funding sources in the behavior of
public officials and citizens. According to Bahl (1992), the fiscal system of subnational
governments can achieve accountability, specifically by financing services with their own
revenues. By using their own revenues to finance services, public officials are more concerned
about spending efficiency as they tend to be more accountable by citizens.

12

Some of the main contributors of the first-generation are Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972).
For a comparative review of the first and second generation theory of fiscal federalism, see (Martinez‐Vazquez,
Lago‐Peñas, & Sacchi, 2017; Oates, 2005; Barry R. Weingast, 2009).
14
Meaning that those who benefit from the service should pay accordingly for those benefits (Bird, 2011).
15
This happens when the expenditure needs of subnational governments exceed their ability to finance them.
13
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Both first and second generation literature argue that the incentives of public officials to
perform well are relevant if they have a significant revenue autonomy (Bird, 2009). Own
revenues are not only "easier" to use but they can also allow getting more resources in the
credit market. Also, citizens can assess the performance concerning the amount and qualities
of services they are getting for the taxes they pay (Yilmaz, 2009).16
On the other hand, transfers cause concern because they generate income that can be
relative substantial, is paid by external actors, and accrues directly to government without
requiring bureaucratic capacity or interaction with citizens. The risk of being financed mostly
with transfers is that elected public officials are less accountable for their fiscal decisions
because they can increase spending without increasing taxes relieving social pressure for
greater accountability (Paler, 2013; Ross, 2001). Also, it could cause a delay in the operations
of local governments since most transfers are assigned to a particular purpose and/or required
an approval process.17 However, there is also empirical evidence that citizens do care about
their share of transfers (Ross, 2012).
Besides the influence that the nature of the funding sources may have on the behavior of
elected public officials, the literature also consider the incentives associated with the electoral
cycle. The theory of political business cycles (PBC) originated with Nordhaus (1975) proposed
a model in which incumbent politicians would manipulate the economy to gain electoral
advantage. The model assumes myopic voters cannot perceive the systematic relationship
between policy decisions and the timing of elections while non-myopic voters are likely to
punish rather than reward the political manipulation of policies directed at securing electoral
advantage (Rosenberg, 1992). The study of Peltzman suggests that American voters are

16

Asatryan, Feld and Geys (2012) found evidence using a sample of OECD countries that greater revenue
decentralization is associated with improved sub-national government budget deficits/surpluses.
17
There are other factors that may also influence public officials and citizens’ behavior. For example, the clarity of
the assignment of responsibilities influences citizens’ capability to assess their local authorities’ performance.
According to Lago-Peñas (2010), it is easier for citizens to correctly assign responsibility for government action
when the political competencies are in the hands of the national government.
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especially averse to higher spending, penalizing candidates irrespective of the political office
up for grabs (Peltzman, 1992). The rationality is that in more developed democracies, voters
are able to identify the strategy of the incumbent. However, most studies show that voters
reward increased public expenditure at national, regional and local levels (Akhmedov &
Zhuravskaya, 2004; Litschig & Morrison, 2012).
There are other researchers that conceive the PBC mechanism through changes in the
expenditure composition rather than its level in order to affect electoral outcomes (Rogoff,
1990). Mayors are more likely to manipulate the expenditure components that are visible to the
electorate in a manner that could signal greater competence (Veiga & Veiga, 2007). The
obvious question would be what those components are. Following the economic classification
used for expenditure budgets, we distinguished between current and capital expenditure.18
Some researchers consider current expenditure more rigid than capital expenditure, 19 therefore
the opportunistic behavior focuses on investment expenditures that are highly visible to the
electorate, such as infrastructure. However, other researchers argue that capital expenditure is
more rigid because most of them are long term and is difficult to coordinate with elections.
Having incomplete projects at election time could create political risks for incumbents, who
may be seen as unable to deliver promised benefits (Block, 2002).
In this paper, we aim to analyze different elements of the expenditure structure that may
have different effects on electoral outcomes: the funding and the components. Considering the
complexity of the rationality of elected public officials and voters, we do not assume these
sides are mutually exclusive.

18

Current expenditure includes the disbursements destined to the operations of production of goods and services.
Capital expenditure includes the acquisition or production of tangible assets which serve for the production of
goods and services (MEF, 2011).
19
For example, items like salaries do not have enough flexibility since they are regulated by contracts.
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1.2.3 Government Performance
Most of the discussion of the importance of government performance has been developed
in the two previous sections.20 Government performance plays a significant role in the
literature of decentralization and electoral accountability. Improving efficiency and equity are
part of the goal of transferring responsibilities and resources to subnational governments and
voters use (a measure of) government performance to evaluate their elected public officials.
The citizens’ evaluation of elected public officials is considered retrospective
evaluation.21 Citizens examine whether the state of the world has improved under the elected
public official's watch, and vote accordingly. If electors vote retrospectively, elections should
make policy makers accountable to the public; and, the threat of losing office in the next
period, compels elected public officials to deliver good services and refrain from extracting
rents (Barro, 1973).
Government performance refers to different concepts. In the context of fiscal
decentralization, fiscal performance refers to the fiscal discipline in the use of the money
(Rodden, 2002; Yilmaz, 1999). There is evidence that voters can reward prudent financial
policy (Brender, 2003).22 However, the literature of government performance has extended
from being initially associated with cost-efficiency improvements to having an emphasis on
effectiveness. Some authors (Ammons, 1997; Carnevale & Carnevale, 1993; DuPont-Morales
& Harris, 1994) highlight the importance of expanding the concept of performance from
traditional measures of monetary resources to include information about an organization’s
purpose, direction, and impact. Table 1.1 shows different types of performance measures.

20

The definition of government performance differs between presidential and subnational elections. While voters
focus on the perception of the national economy at the moment of Presidential elections, it is more likely they will
pay more attention to the activities happening in their jurisdictions in local elections.
21
However, this analysis has mostly focus in national and state elections. According to a study done by Berry and
Howell (2007), less than 1% of the 212 articles on elections published between 1980 and 2000 in ﬁve top political
science journals examined local elections, none of which concerned retrospective voting.
22
The effect is assumed to be driven by the better information availability; voter tendency to focus on local issues;
and, imposing a hard budget constraint by the government.
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Besides the complexity of the concept, there are other challenges associated with
developing a performance measurement system that can be useful for different interest groups
and contribute to different goals (like improving performance and accountability) (Bromberg,
2009). Measuring government performance has the potential to improve the communication
between budget office in the states and legislators, improve service quality and increase
awareness about the results (Willoughby, 2004). However, some incumbents have incentives
to hide taxes, overemphasize the benefits of spending, and hide government liabilities (Benito
& Bastida, 2009).
The discussion of the role of government performance measures in the decision making
process of public officials goes beyond the scope of this paper. Our paper focuses on testing
the role on citizens, specifically voters.
1.3

Peruvian local governments
Peru is a constitutional democratic country located in South America with a population of

31 million as of 2015. The main economic activities are agriculture, fisheries, mining,
exploitation of oil and gas, and manufacturing of goods. The mining industry is the sector with
the greatest growth and contribution to the GDP, exports, and tax input.23
The country has experienced a reduction in poverty over the past decade. The incidence
of poverty has fallen from 59% (2004) to 22% (2015) and extreme poverty has fallen from
over 16% (2004) to less than 5% (2015). However, national averages usually hide the
disparities between age groups and regions.24

By the early 2010s, the value of Peru’s mining exports averaged nearly 25 billion US dollars, or 14% of GDP and
over 50% of total exports. Source: http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/statistics/annual-tables.html. The GDP per capita has
expanded from USD 3,311 in 2000 to USD 6,089 in 2016 (values express in constant 2010 US$). Source:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=PE.
24
For instance, the incidence of poverty among children under 14 years old is around 30%, but in rural areas the
incidence is about the 50% (INEI, 2013, 2016). In 9 of the 26 regions, the incidence of poverty is over 34%. The
regions with the highest incidence of poverty are characterized by a higher physical vulnerability in terms of
occurrence of earthquakes, volcanism, droughts and frosts (MINAM, 2016a).
23
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The country has been undergoing a decentralization process since 2002.25 The process has
been gradual and fiscally conservative trying to preserve fiscal discipline at the subnational
level. Although a lot of regulation was issued and implemented regarding fiscal assignments,
most of it took place on the expenditure side, with very weak attempts to enhance the revenue
autonomy of subnational governments.
1.3.1 Administrative and political organization
The territory is composed of departments (or regions), provinces and districts, which are
the base for the political demarcation.26 There are three major tiers of government: A national
government, regional governments and local governments (or municipalities); this last tier is
divided into provincial and district municipalities. Regional and local governments approve
their own budgets and local governments do not depend hierarchically on the regional
governments. The same way, district municipalities do not depend hierarchically on the
provincial municipalities.27
Local governments consist of a Municipal Council as the policy-making, regulatory and
oversight body, the Mayor as the executive organ, and a Local Coordination Council (CCL) in
charge of promoting public participation mechanisms. The Mayors and councilpersons elected
assume office the first day of January following the election year.28 Citizens have the right to
elect their subnational authorities and the right to request their vacancy or recall from office.29

25

The first attempt of decentralization started at the end of the 1980s. The process reflected the incentives of the
ruling party at the time to build up a subnational power base (Kim, 1992). After following a gradual approach, in
2006, the central government accelerated the transfer of responsibilities (CGP, 2014).
26
The country can also be divided into 3 geographical areas: the coast -where the capital city of Lima is located(that represents 10.5% of the territory); the highlands or Sierra -which contains the country’s major mineral
deposits- (32% of the territory); and the tropical forest -which is the less populated- (57.5% of the territory).
27
The population and number of district municipalities is shown in Table 1.2.
28
Regional governments consist of a Council as the regulatory and oversight body, the Governor as the executive
organ, and a Coordination Council as a consultative body to coordinate with municipalities.
29
The recall process (CPR) is a mechanism that allows citizens to demand a vote for the electorate on whether an
elected public official should be removed from office before the end of his/her term.
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The vote is universal and compulsory until the age of 70 under the imposition of a fine. Local
authorities are elected for four years and, until 2018, could run for immediate reelection.30
The electoral rules and the local political environment influence the local elections; voters
can only cast a single ballot for both Mayor and Local Council, so even if the winning list
receives less than 50%, the Mayor's party is assured a majority on the Local Council. 31 Also,
small political organizations do not face a serious threat of de‐registration if they do not reach
a minimum number of votes (Crabtree, 2010; Morgenstern & Green, 2009). The previous
situation has caused an increase in the number of lists that compete in local elections (see
Table 1.3 which results in a higher vote dispersion and reduces the percentage of votes
obtained by the winner.32
The role played by traditional national political parties has also influenced local elections.
In 1980, national parties had almost full control of local governments. After the 2002
decentralization process, subnational political organizations, particularly regional movements,
became the main force in local politics. In 2014, regional movements had control of more than
50% of local governments (Aragon, Makarin, & Pique, 2015).
The design of the mechanism and the degree of institutionalization of political parties also
explain the significant use of recall referendums (CPRs) (Welp, 2016). To start a recall
referendum, the National Election Board ask to collect some signatures, but it does not require
a legal process to demonstrate acts of corruption or bad management.33 Since its first

30

Mayors are elected by the highest number of votes. An election held in any district or province is declared invalid
if the null or blank votes exceed two thirds of the number of valid votes.
31
The country is characterized by a high level of municipal fragmentation and most of the provinces and districts
have not formalized or updated their political and administrative boundaries or mapping according to the Territorial
Demarcation and Organization Law (see Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2). According to the National Census of 2007,
49% of the districts should be merged for not meeting the minimum number of inhabitants. This is explained in part
by the absence of public services in remote locations.
32
Between 1998 and 2006 only a small percentage of local authorities were elected by majority. In 2002, 1.5% of
the local authorities elected got more than 50% of the votes. In 2006, 57% of the local authorities elected got
between 22% and 33% of the votes (ONPE, 2010).
33
The most recurrent grounds to request a CPR are: i) non-fulfillment of electoral promises, ii) the authority does
not call for open councils, iii) irregularities in the procurement process, iv) does not develop infrastructure, and v)
does not perform all his/her functions (ONPE, 2013a).
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application in 1997, there have been 10 rounds of recalls where more than 5,000 subnational
authorities have been evaluated and more than 1,700 were revoked (see Table 1.4).34 Also, we
found four cases where the Mayor was revoked, but still had the chance to run for reelection
and won. We show one of those cases in Figure 1.3.
1.3.2 Public expenditure structure
The central government has issued several laws to set the expenditure responsibilities of
subnational governments which assigned shared and exclusive competences. Among local
governments, provincial and district municipalities have the same expenditure responsibilities,
the former also have other service responsibilities that extend to the district municipalities
within the provincial boundaries.
Subnational spending has increased in the last years. The share of total spending executed
by subnational governments rose from 30% in 2004 to 40% in 2014. Regarding GDP, the local
government spending rose from 2.5% in 2004 to 4.3% in 2014 (see Table 1.5). However, there
are also great inequalities, the richest district municipality has a per capita spending 250 times
the spending of the poorest one (see Table 1.6).
One of the challenges in the transfer of expenditures responsibilities is the wording of the
regulation. Many functions overlap between the central government and the subnational level
and provide numerous functions with little clarity in their definition (see Table 1.7). Several
studies (Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, & Sepulveda, 2012; Martinez-Vazquez,
2013; OECD, 2016) highlight the need to clarify the shared and exclusive responsibilities
among levels of government and to establish a mechanism for the coordination and resolution
of conflicts among them.

34

Based on this situation, in 2015, the Congress adjusted the laws that regulate elections and recall process. The
new regulation prohibited the immediate reelection of subnational authorities and required them to resign six
months before the election if they want to run for a different position. Also, there is only one recall process during
the third year of the administration period and the replacements of the revoked authorities will remain in office
until the end of the administration period.
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The spending patterns have also been affected by the increased in the revenue sharing
transfers. As the proceeds from extractive industries are by law earmarked to finance
investment projects and associated infrastructure maintenance spending, a bias towards capital
spending was created in the structure of subnational expenditures. As a result, the allocation of
public infrastructure projects in the general budget increased on average from 30% in 2004 to
65% in 2014 for local governments. The requirements about the use of funds on capital
expenditures are likely to have a negative impact on the efficiency and quality of public
services (Martinez-Vazquez, 2013).
To test the relationship between government performance and electoral outcomes, we
take two services provided by local governments in different levels: Municipal Solid Waste
(MSW) management and Education. The provision of the first service relies mostly on local
governments, which makes easier for citizens to identify responsibility. The second one is a
shared responsibility between the central, regional and local government.
1.3.3 Municipal Solid Waste (MSW)
The regulation makes the provincial municipalities responsible for managing solid waste
of domestic and commercial origin. Also, in coordination with the health sector at the national
level, they evaluate and identify the appropriate spaces to implement supervised sanitary
landfills.35 The district municipalities are responsible for the collection and transportation of
these solid wastes, as well as for the cleaning of streets and public spaces. The district
municipalities also have the task of ensuring that fees are charged for the provision of the
service based on the criteria established by the provincial municipality (MINAM, 2016b).
Besides the fees, the service is also financed by taxes and transfers.
During 2013, Peru generated more than 7 million tons of municipal solid waste (MSW),
64% corresponds to household solid waste and 36% to non-household solid waste (see Figure

35

Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA). Report 2013-2014 (in Spanish).
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1.4).36 One of the challenges in the provision of the service is the shortage of suitable places
for final disposal. It is estimated that the country requires 190 infrastructures for the final
disposal of solid waste. However, in 2014 there were only eleven supervised sanitary landfills
with all the requirements and corresponding authorizations, and ten facilities for the disposal
of waste from the non-municipal level at the national level (MINAM, 2013). The main source
of funding is the municipal equalization transfer and the fees have a secondary role. However,
many municipalities do not bother to charge fees despite of providing the service
(OECD/ECLAC, 2017).
1.3.4 Education
The main challenge in the Peruvian education system is the quality of the service. Peru
ranks last among the 65 countries that participated in the Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA) in 2012.37 In 2009, the country occupied the penultimate place in science
and the antepenultimate in math and reading comprehension (PISA, 2010).38 The three levels
of government share the responsibility of provision of education. At the central level, the
Ministry of Education has technical-policy and political functions. It defines, manages and
coordinates the education policy in coordination with regional governments. The local
governments guard the operation of primary education.39 Local governments are not directly
responsible for the provision of educational services, their role is to support and promote
education. Possibly the main task of local governments is the infrastructure and equipment of
schools (World Bank, 2010a).

36

Peru has a population of more than 30 million and more than 23 million lived in cities (urban population),
representing 76% of total population. The national average of MSW is more than 18 thousand tons per day from
which only 48% is disposed in a supervised sanitary landfill; the remnant is being inadequately disposed in the
environment (MINAM, 2014).
37
PISA is an international survey which aims to evaluate education systems. The exam is prepared by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). http://www.oecd.org/pisa/aboutpisa/
38
Students in rural areas are a critical group because they often speak an indigenous language and study in classrooms
that combine a wide variety of ages and grades under a single teacher (Cueto, 2004).
39
Primary education comprises six degrees organized in three cycles of two years each.
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The design of the decentralization of education has been inefficient. The subnational
government expenditure powers are not well defined in the legal framework. Thus, there are
overlaps or contradictions in the responsibilities among levels of government (Consejo
Nacional de Educación, 2010). The budget structure for education limits the autonomy of
decentralized bodies and their ability to improve the quality of services. The budget allocation
is based on historical records, which limits the possibilities of subnational governments to
generate significant changes. Also, the funding mechanisms have proved more complex than
expected, which has led to delays in the transfer of resources and raise transaction costs for the
provision of services (World Bank, 2010a).
1.3.5 Revenue structure
Peruvian municipalities generate revenues from taxes and user charges (for services like
street cleaning, road tolls, parks maintenance, public safety services, and construction
permits).40 District municipalities collect the property tax and the tax on transfers of real
estate, and provincial municipalities collect the tax on motor vehicles and taxes on public
entertainment, lotteries and gambling. However, the current fiscal decentralization framework
provides low revenue autonomy to subnational governments.41 The central government sets
the tax rates and regulations on the tax bases. The main characteristics of the tax revenue
assignment can be seen in Table 1.8.
The local taxation exhibits a low efficiency due to generous exemptions, weak tax
administration, lack of a complete or updated cadaster of properties (Alfaro & Rühling, 2007).
Although there has been a recent improvement in tax collection (see Table 1.9), the

40

Local governments also have access to borrowing, but due to their reduced access to credit markets and the tight
borrowing restrictions, the level of indebtedness is very low.
41
Tax assignments for local governments had been defined in 1993 and the decentralization laws did not change
them substantially. In the case of regional governments, they do not have tax assignments and their own revenues
consist of user charges, fees and other small revenue sources.
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performance of the main local tax (property tax) is significantly lower relative to other
countries in the region (see Figure 1.5).
Overall, the share of own revenues over the total has experienced a decreasing tendency
falling from 36% of total revenues in 2004 to 26% in 2014. In the particular case of tax
revenues, in the majority of local governments, own tax revenues represent less than 5% of
total revenues. There is revenue disparity among local governments and a significant
dependency on intergovernmental transfers. Only in the municipalities of Metropolitan Lima the capital city- the tax revenue represents around 40% of their total revenues. As a result,
local governments’ finances heavily rely on intergovernmental transfers that bridge the gap
between increasing spending needs associated to the gradual decentralization of functional
responsibilities and their low capacity to raise own revenues.
1.3.6 Intergovernmental transfers
There are two major types of intergovernmental transfers to local governments: Canon
and FONCOMUN (FCM). The first one comes from the exploitation of natural resources,42 it
is allocated on an origin basis and earmarked for investment and maintenance spending.43
FCM is an unconditional equalization transfer that is allocated to all local governments by a
measure of expenditure needs.44 There is a third earmarked transfer “Ordinary Resources”
(OR) set to finance operating costs of decentralized functions; however, its allocation criteria
seems more discretionary compared to the previous ones.45

42

There are different types of Canon: forest canon, gas canon, hydro-energetic canon, mining canon, fishing canon,
oil canon and sobrecanon, mining royalties.
43
The central government collects the taxes from the mining companies and then distributes to subnational
governments. The distribution criteria is shown in Table 1.10.
44
It was established in 1994 with the objective of promoting investment in local governments. It is financed by the
Municipal Promotion Tax (IPM) which is a surtax rate of 2% on top of the central government's VAT; a tax on
vehicles that use gasoline; and, a tax on recreational crafts.
45
Other transfers, less significant in terms of their magnitude, include the Fund for the Promotion of Regional and
Local Public Investment which provides matching grants for investment projects directed to reduce infrastructure
and social service delivery gaps; the Socioeconomic Development Fund of the Camisea Project that finances basic
social infrastructure investments in areas affected by the Camisea Project; and the conditional cash transfer for the
modernization of municipalities.
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The share of Canon in the local governments’ revenue increased from 15% in 2004 to
39% in 2011 and then fell to 32% in 2014 due to the variation in the commodity prices (see
Table 1.11). The evolution of the Canon is the most significant factor influencing the
distribution of fiscal resources among local governments, and their revenue and spending
patterns. There are around 500 district municipalities for which natural resource-related
revenues account for 50& or more of their total revenues. The share of Canon made local
budgets vulnerable to external shocks and added more volatility to their revenue flows. Also,
there are several requirements for the use of Canon in capital expenditure. While this may be
an understandable reaction to the overspending that took place at the beginning, it appears
impractical when hundreds of local governments have more than 50% of revenues stemming
from the Canon (World Bank, 2010b).
On the other hand, the relative importance of FCM on local governments’ revenues has
slightly decreased over time from 30% of total revenues in 2004 to around 25% in 2014 (see
Table 1.11). Its allocation formula does not include fiscal capacity, 46 which means that
beneficiaries with high fiscal capacity such as the local governments that receive Canon, also
receive FCM transfers proportionate to their expenditure needs.47
1.4

Hypotheses
We tested the role of government performance and spending in the probability of elected

public officials of being removed or reelected. We consider two services provided by local
governments in different magnitudes: Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) collection and
Education. The provision of the first service relies mostly on local governments, which makes
easier for citizens to identify who bears the responsibility. For Education, the responsibility is

46

The allocation criteria of the FCM is presented in detailed in subsection 2.4.2.
The first stage in the allocation process considers the expenditure needs at the province level to determine the
total to be assigned to the province, which affects the districts whose expenditure needs are “higher” than the
overall province. For example, two identical districts may receive different transfer amounts just because they are
in provinces with overall different fiscal needs. The formula also guarantees a minimum transfer level to all local
governments which offset the effect of considering measures of expenditure needs.
47
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shared between the central, regional and local government. We consider the link between
government performance and electoral outcomes as evidence of electoral accountability. In
other words, a better performance decreases the Mayors’ probability of being revoked and
increases their probability of being reelected. We formally specify the hypotheses as follows:
•

Mayors that provide a daily collection of MSW have a lower probability of being revoked
than those that do not offer the service daily, keeping other variables constant.

•

Mayors that provide a daily collection of MSW have a higher probability of being
reelected than those that do not offer the service daily, keeping other variables constant.

•

An increase in the percentage of dropouts among students in primary school increases
Mayors probability of being revoked, keeping other variables constant.

•

An increase in the percentage of dropouts among students in primary school decreases
Mayors probability of being reelected, keeping other variables constant.
Due to the different incentives associated with the expenditure components and the

funding sources, the link with electoral outcomes is less straightforward. We would expect a
positive effect on electoral outcomes for increases in total spending and the opposite effect
when total spending decreases.
•

An increase in total expenditure decreases Mayors’ probability of being revoked, keeping
other variables constant.

•

An increase in total expenditure increases Mayors’ probability of being reelected, keeping
other variables constant.
In addition, we aim to analyze whether the expenditure components have different effects

on electoral outcomes. Following the economic classification used for expenditure budgets, we
distinguished between current and capital expenditure. We specify the hypotheses as follows:
•

An increase in capital expenditure decreases Mayors’ probability of being revoked,
keeping other variables constant.
21

•

An increase in capital expenditure increases Mayors’ probability of being reelected,
keeping other variables constant.
Finally, we analyze whether the expenditure funding shares have different effects on

electoral outcomes. We formally specify the hypotheses as follows:
•

An increases in the portion of expenditures financed with transfers decreases Mayors’
probability of being revoked, keeping other variables constant.

•

An increases in the portion of expenditures financed with transfers increases Mayors’
probability of being reelected, keeping other variables constant.
Other variables tested are the political alignment with the provincial municipality (being

from the same political organization as the provincial municipality Mayor reduces the
probability of being recalled and increases the probability of being reelected) and gender
(Female Mayors have a higher probability of being recalled and lower probability of being
reelected than male Mayors). Also, we include altitude, land area and average household
expenditures to control for the accessibility, size of the district and economic conditions of the
district. The summary of the expected effects is shown in Table 1.12.
1.5

Data and empirical methodology
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the extent to which government performance

and expenditure structure affect the probabilities of a Mayor of being revoked and reelected.
For this purpose, we perform a cross-section analysis, which subjects the results to the political
and economic circumstances at the time of the cross-section observation and the fixed effect of
the districts. We use a set of control variables to isolate specific features of the districts. The
Mayor of the district municipality is the unit of analysis.
The data were obtained from several public organizations: The Ministry of Finance
(MEF), Ministry of Education (MINEDU), Ministry of Environment (MINAM) and from the
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National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI). The electoral data was collected from
the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) and the National Election Board (JNE).
The list of variables that are part of the analysis and their definitions is shown in Table
1.13 and the summary statistics are shown in Table 1.14. Our sample considers 1,632 district
municipalities for the period 2011-2014.48 From that group, 1,267 district Mayors (77.6%)
were not part of the recall process, 276 (17%) were part of the recall process, but not revoked
and 89 (5.4%) were revoked. Also, 1,020 (62.5%) decided to run for reelection, 319 (31.3%)
won and 701 (68.7%) lost.
We consider two measures of performance: The first one is the educational outcomes
measured as the percentage of students in primary school that drop out; the second one is the
frequency of the trash collection. To test the effect of the expenditure funding sources, we
consider the expenses financed with transfers. To test the effect of the expenditure
components, we consider the capital and current expenditures.
The first dependent variable is an ordinal variable with a value of 0 if the Mayor is not
part of a recall process, 1 if the Mayor was part of the recall process but not revoked and 2 if
the Mayor is revoked. The second dependent variable is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if
the Mayor is reelected and 0 otherwise. We use an ordered logit model to analyze the effect of
the covariates in the recall process and a Probit binary model to analyze the effect of the
covariates in the reelection process. Some of the challenges of the empirical methodology are
the presence of multicollinearity49 and the rejection of the proportionality of odds assumption.
The details of each model are developed in the following sections.

48

We took out from the sample the municipalities that were created after 2010 and the particular case of a province
that has only one district. The evolution of the number of districts is shown in Table 1.2.
49
Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables in the model are approximately determined by
a linear combination of other independent variables in the model.
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1.5.1 Probability of being recall
We use an ordered logit model to analyze the effect of the covariates in the recall process.
Our dependent variable is revoked (𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖 ), an ordinal variable with a value of 0 if the
Mayor is not part of a recall process, 1 if the Mayor was part of the recall process but not
revoked and 2 if the Mayor is revoked.
𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖 = 𝑥1 𝛼 + 𝑥2 𝛽 + 𝑥3 𝛿 + 𝑥4 𝛾 + 𝜂𝑖

1.1

𝑥1 is a fixed matrix that includes the variables related to performance, daily provision of
MSW and percentage of dropouts in primary education: 𝑥1 𝛼 = 𝛼1 𝑀𝑆𝑊𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑖 .
𝑥2 is a matrix that includes the variables related to expenditure. Depending on how these
covariates are decomposed, we consider four different models: Model 1: natural log of total
expenditure per capita considered as a single covariate and the share of the expenditures
finance with transfers, 𝑥2 𝛽 = 𝛽1 𝑡𝑜_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑡𝑟_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑖 ; Model 2: natural log of total
expenditure per capita is divided into current and capital expenditures and the share of the
expenditures finance with transfers, 𝑥2 𝛽 = 𝛽1 𝑐𝑢_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑐𝑎_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑡𝑟_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑖 ; Model 3:
natural log of total expenditure per capita considered as a single covariate and the natural log
of total expenditure finance with transfers per capita, 𝑥2 𝛽 = 𝛽1 𝑡𝑜_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑡𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 ; and,
Model 4: natural log of total expenditure per capita is divided into current and capital
expenditures and the natural log of total expenditure finance with transfers per capita, 𝑥2 𝛽 =
𝛽1 𝑐𝑢_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑐𝑎_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑡𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 .
𝑥3 is a fixed matrix that includes the political variables: 𝑥3 𝛿 = 𝛿1 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
𝛿2 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿3 𝑛𝑟𝑜_𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 . Finally, 𝑥4 is a fixed matrix that includes the control
variables and the intercept: 𝑥4 𝛾 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾2 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾3 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 .
The ordered logit model assumes an underlying linear relationship that is the same at any
cut-point. This is called the proportional odds assumption or the parallel regression
assumption. To test whether this is the case we apply the oparallel command.
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1.5.2 Probability of being reelected
We use a Probit binary model to analyze the effect of the covariates in the reelection
process. Our dependent variable is reelection (𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖 ), a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the
Mayor is reelected and 0 otherwise.
𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖 = 𝑥1 𝛼 + 𝑥2 𝛽 + 𝑥3 𝛿 + 𝑥4 𝛾 + 𝜐𝑖

1.2

𝑥1 is a fixed matrix that includes the variables related to performance, daily provision of
MSW and percentage of dropouts in primary education: 𝑥1 𝛼 = 𝛼1 𝑀𝑆𝑊𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑖 . 𝑥2 is a
matrix that includes the variables related to expenditure. Depending on how these covariates
are decomposed, we consider two different models: Model 1: natural log of total expenditure
per capita considered as a single covariate and the share of the expenditures finance with
transfers, 𝑥2 𝛽 = 𝛽1 𝑡𝑜_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑡𝑟_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑖 ; and, Model 2: natural log of total expenditure per
capita considered as a single covariate and the natural log of total expenditure finance with
transfers per capita, 𝑥2 𝛽 = 𝛽1 𝑡𝑜_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑡𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 .50 𝑥3 is a fixed matrix that includes the
political variables: 𝑥3 𝛿 = 𝛿1 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛿2 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿3 𝑛𝑟𝑜_𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 . Finally, 𝑥4 is
a fixed matrix that includes the control variables and the intercept: 𝑥4 𝛾 = 𝛾0 +
𝛾1 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾2 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾3 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 .
In addition, we use a Heckman selection model using the Mayor’s affiliation to a political
party (rather than other types of political organizations) as instrumental variable to control for
selection bias. Initially, we do not consider the selection bias and used an ordinal dependent
variable (𝑅𝐸𝐸3𝑖 ) with a value of 0 if the Mayor lost 2014 local elections; 1 if the Mayor did
not run on 2014 local elections; and, 2 if the Mayor was reelected. 𝑅𝐸𝐸3𝑖 = 𝑥1 𝛼 + 𝑥2 𝛽 +
𝑥3 𝛿 + 𝑥4 𝛾 + 𝜂𝑖 where 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 and 𝑥4 represent the same set of matrix introduce for the
previous model.

50

We test the same four models that were used for the probability to be revoked, but not of the coefficients were
significant therefore we did not include them in the analysis.
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1.6

Results

1.6.1 Probability of being recalled
The results of the effect of performance and expenditure on the probability of a Mayor to
be revoked can be seen in Table 1.15 reported as odds-ratios. To test the proportional odds
assumption in our models we applied the oparallel command; the outcomes confirm the
relationship is proportional across all the test statistics for the four models (see results in Table
1.16). The initial analysis included the information about performance and expenditure in a
yearly format and as an average. However, the challenge of using a yearly format is the high
correlation among years which undermines the significance of the independent variable. In this
paper, we show the formats that present higher significance.
The coefficients of the variables are significant and consistent across the four models.
The measures of performance (daily provision of garbage collection and percentage of dropout
among students in primary school) show the expected sign. The measures of expenditure based
on their components have different effects in the probability of being revoked. While
increasing total expenses per capita decreases the probability of being revoked; when we
consider the expenditure by components, increasing current expenses per capita increases the
probability of being revoked. The political variables confirm the importance of political
alignment with the upper level of government (Mayor of provincial municipality) and the bias
against Female Mayors. Also, a higher number of candidates in the elections of 2010 seems to
reduce the probability of a Mayor of being revoked. Finally, the control variables show that
less geographic accessibility (measure as higher altitude and bigger territory) decreases the
probability of being revoked.
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1.6.2 Probability of being reelected
The results of the effect of performance and expenditure on the probability of a Mayor to
be reelected can be seen in Table 1.17.51 The first two columns show the results of the Probit
model without correcting the selections bias. The next two columns show the results of the
Heckman Probit model.52 According to the results of the Wald test we reject the null Rho=0;
therefore, we use the results of the Heckman Probit model.53 Also, as the previous case of the
probability to be revoked, the analysis consider the information about performance and
expenditure in a yearly format and as an average. Again, we show the formats that present
higher significance.
Both measures of performance show the expected impact in the probability of being
reelected, but only the first one is significant. From the measures of expenditure based on their
components, the total expenditure per capita has a significant and positive effect in the
probability of being reelected, but we did not find different effects based on their components.
Finally, a higher number of candidates in the elections of 2010 seems to reduce the probability
of a Mayor of being reelected. The rest of political and control variables were insignificant.
1.7

Conclusions
How to manage the money in order to provide goods and services that satisfy the needs

and preferences of citizens is a general question that runs across different fields. Political
Science, Public Finance and Budgeting have their approach of who are the main stakeholders
and mechanism that influence their behavior. According to the literature of fiscal
decentralization, transferring resources and responsibilities to lower levels of government can
improve public spending efficiency, partially motivated by the citizens’ political participation.

51

The results of the analysis in which the selection bias is not treated and the dependent variable is an ordinal
variable is shown in Table 1.18. We use an ordered probit model and a multinomial probit model. We test the
proportional odds assumption with a LR test. The results shown in Table 1.19 provided evidence that the
assumption has been violated.
52
The results for the interest equation are on the top of the table and the selection equation are at the bottom.
53
Rho is the correlation between the errors of the interest equation and the selection equation.
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According to the literature of electoral accountability, government performance can be
improve by providing mechanism through which citizens can reward or punish public officials.
Finally, the literature of government performance, address the criteria to measure performance
and to incorporate this information in the decision making process of stakeholders.
This paper attempts to integrate these fields in order to provide a comprehensive
empirical analysis of electoral accountability using the case of the Peruvian municipalities.
The advantage of using a case study is that we incorporate the explanatory effect of the
variability within the country to analyze the presence of electoral accountability from the
perspective of the voter. This paper focuses in two mechanisms of electoral accountability:
recalls and elections. Even though both mechanism follow a similar structure, recalls allow to
remove elected representatives before the end of their regular term and it requires the proactive
involvement of voters in collecting the signatures to initiate the recall process.
The novelty of this paper is providing a case in which both mechanism can be tested. The
variables to government performance, political environment and accessibility seems to be
more significant in the Mayor’s probability of being revoked than being reelected. Another
finding is that voters seem to assign different valuation for the expenses based on their
components, for the case of probability to be revoked. While increasing the percentage of total
expenses per capita decreases the probability of being revoked and increases the probability of
being reelected; when we consider the expenditure by components, the increase in the
percentage of current expenses per capita increases the probability of being revoked. Despite
these results, the effectiveness of the recall and election process is still subject of analysis. As
we noticed before there are cases where a Mayor that was formally revoked had the
opportunity to run for reelection and win.
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Table 1.1 Types of performance measures
Type
Inputs

Process
/Activity
Outputs

Outcomes

Definition
Measures of financial and
nonfinancial resources that are
applied when providing services.
Measures of regular activities
conducted within the
organization.
Measures of the quantity of
services provided or the quantity
of service that meets a certain
quality requirement.
Measures of the results that
occur, at least in part, because of
services provided. This may
include initial, intermediate, or
long-term outcomes.

Example
The amount spent on road
maintenance or the amount spent for
serious crime investigations.
The number of applications
processed.
The number of lane miles of road
repaired or the number of serious
crimes reported.

The percentage of lane miles of road
maintained in excellent, good, or fair
condition or the clearance rate for
serious crimes, or the percentage of
residents rating their neighborhood
as safe or very safe.
Cost
Measures of the resources used,
The cost per lane mile or road
/Efficiency
such as the cost per unit of output repaired or the cost per serious crime
or outcome.
investigated or per arrest for a
serious crime.
Quality
Measures of the quality of the
The extent to which customers are
/Customer
outputs/outcomes and/or
satisfied with an aspect of service
Satisfaction
assessment of the quality of the
delivery.
service/program by stakeholders.
Explanatory
Relating to factors other than the The percentage of trucks in vehicle
services being provided that may traffic or the unemployment rate in
have affected the reported
the community.
performance.
Benchmarks
The comparison of performance
Comparing a particular performance
data to other similar entities or
measure of one of your state
timeframes.
programs with that same measure
from a similar program of another
state government.
Source: (Melkers & Willoughby, 2005; Willoughby, 2004)
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Table 1.2 Number and population of district municipalities, 2007-2015
Year

Number of
Population Population
Minimum
Maximum
district
(average)
(standard
district
district
municipalities
deviation)
population population
2007
1,639
12,677
43,776
188
922,833
2008
1,639
12,849
44,644
186
942,619
2009
1,639
13,021
45,531
185
962,554
2010
1,643
13,184
46,398
184
983,095
2011
1,643
13,363
47,304
182
1,000,000
2012
1,643
13,533
48,019
181
1,000,000
2013
1,647
13,777
48,805
180
1,000,000
2014
1,655
13,991
50,712
178
1,100,000
2015
1,658
14,155
51,424
177
1,100,000
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI)
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Figure 1.1 Number of districts per province

Notes: The map shows 194 of the 196 provinces. The data was extracted from the GADM
database (www.gadm.org), version 2.8, November 2015. The boundary information is for
statistical data collection and tabulation purposes only.
Source: INEI
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Figure 1.2 Situation of territorial demarcation

Source: National Office of Dialogue and Sustainability (ONDS).
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Table 1.3 Number of lists that competed in local elections
Number of Lists that competed
in the local elections
More than 17
Between 11 and 17
Between 6 and 10
Less than 6
Number of municipalities
Total lists
Source: (INFOGOB-JNE)

1998
2.2%
31.6%
66.2%
1,811
7,690
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Election year
2002
2006
0.8%
0.4%
18.3%
9.6%
62.4% 57.3%
18.5% 32.7%
1,834
1,834
14,965 12,747

2010
0.3%
10.8%
58.2%
30.6%
1,834
13,052

Table 1.4 Recall processes in Peru from 1997 to 2013
1997

2001

2004

2005

2008

2009

2012

2013

61
42

166
11

187
29

19
11

240
95

67
22

264
69

591
188

Regional authorities
Part of the process
129
Revoked
93
Source: (ONPE, 2013b)

462
27

691
109

75
42

999
444

271
132

1040
400

42
25

Local authorities
Part of the process
Revoked
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Figure 1.3 Case of a Mayor that was revoked, but was reelected in the next election

Source: INFOGOB (http://www.infogob.com.pe)
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Table 1.5 Local government expenditures as a % of GDP, 2004-2014
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Current
expenditures
Capital
expenditures
Debt
service

1.45

1.37

1.30

1.42

1.56

1.72

1.72

1.69

1.89

1.84

1.82

0.91

0.91

1.33

1.34

2.08

2.54

2.40

1.86

2.45

2.63

2.45

0.16

0.17

0.11

0.06

0.07

0.07

0.09

0.04

0.06

0.07

0.06

Total
2.52 2.45 2.73
Source: Ministry of Finance.

2.82

3.70

4.33

4.22

3.60

4.40

4.54

4.32
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Table 1.6 Per capita spending by type of municipality, 2009-2014 (in new sols of 2014)

Provincial municipality/1
Max
Min
CoV
# of province municipalities

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

21,868
183
1.48
195

36,157
232
2.01
195

17,243
255
1.25
195

21,866
331
1.20
195

21,850
314
1.09
195

20,845
353
1.05
195

District municipality
Max
25,825 45,829 37,291 24,815 29,913 33,122
Min
120
122
110
137
130
128
CoV
1.18
1.58
1.31
1.12
1.29
1.18
# of district municipalities
1,622
1,626
1,632
1,637
1,637
1,637
Source: Ministry of Finance.
/1 The amounts are divided by the population of the district where the provincial municipality is
located.
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Table 1.7 Allocation of responsibilities by level of government

Exclusive

Shared

Central government

Regional governments

Local governments

Foreign relations
Defense, national security,
and armed forces
Justice, with the exception
of Justice administration
Internal order, national
and border police
Tax administration of
national scope and
national public borrowing
Foreign trade and tariff
policy
Regulation of merchant
marine and commercial
air transport
Regulation of public
services
Regulation of public
infrastructure of national
scope
Any others set by law in
accordance with the
Constitution
Design and supervision of
national and sectoral
policies, which are
compulsory for all levels
of government
All other responsibilities

Regional development
plans and executing
corresponding socioeconomic programs
Internal organization of the
regional government
Promote and implement
public investment of
regional scope in roads,
communications, and basic
services
Development of tourism
circuits
Administer state land
within their jurisdiction
(except municipal land)
Demarcation of territorial
limits within the region
Modernization of small
and medium enterprises
Promote sustainable use of
forestry and biodiversity
resources

Urban and rural municipal
development
Management and regulation of
local public services
Internal organization of the local
government
Local development plan
Execution and monitoring of local
public infrastructure

Education: management of
education services for preschool, primary,
secondary, and higher
education (except
university)
Public health
Regulation of economic
activities in their sphere
Sustainable management of
natural resources and
improving the environment
Preserving and
administering regional
natural reserves
Culture and arts
Regional competitiveness
and job promotion
Citizens’ participation

Education: take part in
management of education services
as would be determined in the
sectoral law
Public health
Culture, tourism, recreation, and
sports
Security (seguridad ciudadana)
Monument conservation
Public transport and traffic
Housing and urban rehabilitation
Service and management of social
programs
Management of social programs
Waste management

Source: (World Bank, 2010b)
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Figure 1.4 Generation of Municipal Solid Waste, 2008-2013 (thousands of tons per year)

8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
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2008

2009

Household Waste

2010

2011

Non-household waste

Source: MINAM-SIGERSOL
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2012

2013

Municipal Solid Waste

Table 1.8 Main characteristics of municipal tax revenue assignments
Revenue shares
Districts
Provinces

Tax rates

District administration:
Land and buildings

100% (5% for
cadaster
maintenance)

0%

< 15 UIT: 0.2% (or 0.6%)
15-60 UIT: 0.6%
> 60 UIT: 1.0%

50%

50% (to Municipal
Investment Fund)

3% (first 3 UIT exempted)

Games (pinball,
bingo, etc)

100%

0%

10%

Public shows

100%

0%

Bullfighting: 5%
Horse racing: 10%
Others: 15%

0%

100%

1% (minimum: 1.5% UIT)

40%

60%

20% (horse racing: 12%)

Property transfers

Provincial administration:
Vehicle property
Bets

Games (lotteries)
0%
100%
10%
Notes: The Law Decree No. 776 establishes taxes on property as the main tax revenue sources
for municipalities. There is also a set of national taxes that correspond to the municipalities but
are collected by the central government which later transfer to them. UIT or “Tributary Tax
Unit” is a monetary measure used to set the value of taxes, fees, penalties and other legal
payments equivalent to 3,950 new soles in 2016 (US$ 1,170 on December 24, 2015).
Source: (Gomez, Martinez-Vazquez, & Sepulveda, 2010).
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Figure 1.5 Property tax to GDP ratio, Peru and selected comparators

Source: (OECD).
Note: We are comparing the component “4100-Recurrent taxes on immovable property”
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Table 1.9 Revenue composition of local governments, 2004-2014 (as % of GDP)

Own revenues
Property tax/0
Other tax revenues
Nontax revenues/1

2004
0.91
0.23
0.06
0.62

2005
0.91
0.25
0.05
0.61

2006
0.74
0.22
0.04
0.48

2007
0.84
0.30
0.04
0.50

2008
0.91
0.32
0.05
0.54

2009
0.97
0.33
0.06
0.58

2010
0.88
0.34
0.05
0.49

2011
0.88
0.35
0.05
0.48

2012
0.95
0.39
0.05
0.51

2013
0.93
0.41
0.06
0.47

2014
0.89
0.39
0.05
0.44

Transfers
Canon/2
FCM
Other transfers

1.47
0.38
0.76
0.33

1.65
0.66
0.79
0.20

1.78
0.91
0.81
0.05

2.73
1.71
0.86
0.16

2.66
1.53
0.92
0.22

2.08
1.17
0.82
0.09

2.29
1.14
0.78
0.37

2.52
1.37
0.80
0.35

2.60
1.50
0.82
0.28

2.35
1.26
0.82
0.28

2.19
1.08
0.86
0.25

Capital revenues/3

0.15

0.08

0.10

0.09

0.11

0.21

0.24

0.15

0.21

0.17

0.31

Total
2.53
2.64
2.62
3.67
3.68
3.27
/0 includes vehicle property, property transfer and land and buildings property.
/1 Includes fees, rental of property, service charges, sales of goods, fines and others.
/2 includes canon, sobrecanon, royalties, customs duties and concession rights.
/3 Includes sales of assets and capital transfers.
Source: Ministry of Finance.

3.41

3.56

3.75

3.45

3.39
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Table 1.10 Distribution procedure for the revenues from Canon
Share
Beneficiaries
Distribution Criteria
10%
District municipalities within which the
Equal share
natural resources are exploited
25%
Municipalities of the province within
Population and Unmet Basic
which the natural resources are exploited
Needs
40%
Municipalities of the region within
Population and Unmet Basic
which the natural resources are
Needs
exploited
25 % 80% to Regional Government of the
region, and 20% to the universities in the
region
Notes: The criteria are applicable to the revenues collected from the exploitation of mining, gas,
hydro-energetic, fishing and forest resources (excludes oil canon). The oil canon is governed by
different rules for the areas of Loreto, Ucayali, Piura, Tumbes, and Huanuco.
Source: (Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2012) and Law No. 27506 (Law on the Canon).
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Table 1.11 Revenue structure of local governments, 2004-2014 (%)
2004
36
9
2
24

2005
34
9
2
23

2006
28
8
1
18

2007
23
8
1
14

2008
25
9
1
15

2009
30
10
2
18

2010
26
10
1
14

2011
25
10
1
14

2012
25
10
1
14

2013
27
12
2
14

2014
26
12
2
13

58
15
30
13

63
25
30
8

68
35
31
2

75
47
24
4

72
41
25
6

64
36
25
3

67
33
23
11

71
39
22
10

69
40
22
8

68
36
24
8

65
32
25
7

6

3

4

3

3

6

7

4

5

5

9

Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
/0 includes vehicle property, property transfer and land and buildings property.
/1 Includes fees, rental of property, service charges, sales of goods, fines and others.
/2 includes canon, sobrecanon, royalties, customs duties and concession rights.
/3 Includes sales of assets and capital transfers.
Source: Ministry of Finance.

100

100

100

100

100

Own revenues
Property tax/0
Other tax revenues
Nontax revenues/1
Transfers
Canon/2
FCM
Other transfers
Capital revenues/3
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Table 1.12 Expected impact in the probability of being revoked and reelected
Independent variables

Probability of being:
Revoked
Reelected

Performance
Provides daily trash collection service
Percentage of dropouts in primary education
Fiscal performance
Percentage of expenditure financed with Transfer
Log of exp. per capita financed with Transfer
Log of total exp. per capita
Log of capital exp. per capita
Log of current exp. per capita
Political variables
Political alignment
Male Mayor
Number of candidates
Socio-economic variables
Log of Avg. of HH monthly exp. per capita, 2013
Log of Altitude (meters above sea level)
Log of Territory (square kilometers)
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negative
positive

positive
negative

negative
negative
negative
negative
uncertain

positive
positive
positive
positive
uncertain

negative
negative
uncertain

positive
positive
uncertain

uncertain
uncertain
uncertain

uncertain
uncertain
uncertain

Table 1.13 Variable definitions and sources
Variables / Definition
Dependent variables
Recall (RECALL): 0 "Mayor was not part of a
recall process" 1 "Mayor was part of a recall
process, but not revoked" 2 "Mayor was part of
a recall process and revoked"

Period

Source

2012 & 2013

National Office of Electoral Processes
(ONPE), National Jury of Elections (JNE)

Reelection (REE3): 0 "Didn't run on 2014 local
elections" 1 "Didn't win on 2014 local
elections" 2 "Won on 2014 local elections"
Reelection (REE): 0 "Didn't win on 2014 local
elections" 1 "Won on 2014 local elections"

Elections of 2014

ONPE, JNE

Elections of 2014

ONPE, JNE

2010-2014
2011-2014

National Registry of Municipalities
(RENAMU)
Peruvian Ministry of Education (MINEDU)

2010-2014

Peruvian Ministry of Finance (MEF)

2010-2014
2010-2014
2010-2014

MEF
MEF
MEF

2010-2014
2010-2014
2010-2014
2010-2014
2010-2014

MEF
MEF
MEF
MEF
MEF

Elections of 2010
Elections of 2010

ONPE, JNE
ONPE, JNE

Elections of 2010

ONPE, JNE

2013

National Institute of Statistics and
Information (INEI)
INEI
INEI

Independent variables
Performance
Daily trash collection service: 1 "provides
service daily" 0 "otherwise"
Percentage of dropouts in primary education
Fiscal performance
Percentage of expenditure financed with
Transfer (Canon + FCM)
Percentage of expenditure financed with Canon
Percentage of expenditure financed with FCM
Log of exp. per capita financed with Transfer
(Canon + FCM)
Log of exp. per capita financed with Canon
Log of exp. per capita financed with FCM
Log of total exp. per capita
Log of capital exp. per capita
Log of current exp. per capita
Political variables
Number of candidates
Political alignment: 1 "same political party as
province municipality Mayor" 0 "otherwise"
Gender of Mayor: 0 "female" 1 "male"
Socio-economic variables
Log of Avg. of HH monthly exp. (n.s. per
capita), 2013
Log of Altitude (meters above sea level)
Log of Territory (square kilometers)

NA
NA
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Table 1.14 Summary statistics
Variable
Independent variables
Performance
Daily trash collection service, 2010
Daily trash collection service, 2011
Percentage of dropouts in primary education, 2011
Percentage of dropouts in primary education, 2013
Fiscal performance
Percentage of expenditure financed with Transfer,
avg. 2012-2013
Percentage of expenditure financed with Transfer,
2012
Log of exp. per capita financed with Transfer, avg.
2012-2013
Log of total exp. per capita, avg. 2012-2013
Log of total exp. per capita, 2013
Log of capital exp. per capita, avg. 2012-2013
Log of current exp. per capita, avg. 2012-2013
Political variables
Number of candidates on 2010 local elections
Political alignment
Male
Socio-economic variables
Log of Household monthly exp., 2013
Log of Altitude
Log of Territory

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

1632
1632
1632
1632

.3008578
0.31495
3.54142
2.21103

0.45877
0.46464
3.07981
2.02930

0
0
0
0

1
1
39.6
16.7

68.49027

20.20906

0.56375

99.49161

70.63025

22.86505

0.93461

99.51012

6.46304

0.84507

2.67931

10.15982

1632
1632
1632
1632

6.94792
6.89118
6.49117
5.73667

0.69517
0.73748
0.88199
0.58888

4.91394
4.83551
2.52453
4.35762

10.19311
10.27410
10.12062
8.93189

1632
1632
1632

6.88052
0.29228
0.96385

2.66270
0.45495
0.18673

1
0
0

20
1
1

1632
1632
1632

5.90469
7.12771
5.27317

0.36435
1.58405
1.42677

4.78458
1.09861
0.68813

7.56783
8.44998
10.08789

1632
1632
1632
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Table 1.15 Effect of fiscal and policy variables in probability of Mayors to be revoked
(OLOGIT-odds-ratio)

MSW-Daily, 2010
Percentage of dropouts,
primary edu., 2011
Log of current exp.
per capita, avg. 2012-2013
Log of capital exp.
per capita, avg. 2012-2013
Log of total exp.
per capita, avg. 2012-2013
Log of exp. per capita financed
with Transfer, avg. 2012-2013
Exp. financed with
Transfer (%), avg. 2012-2013
Same pol. org. that
prov. Mayor in 2010
Mayor-Male
Number of candidates
in 2010 local elections
Log of Avg. of HH monthly
exp. (n.s. per capita), 2013
Log of Altitude
Log of Area
Constant cut1
Constant cut2

(1)
Model 1
0.719**
1.042**

(2)
Model 2
0.713**
1.038**

(3)
Model 3
0.724**
1.041**

(4)
Model 4
0.719**
1.037**

1.529***

1.791***

0.542***

0.726***

0.514***

1.001

2.004***

1.606***
1.015***

1.011***

0.716**

0.712**

0.721**

0.714**

0.545**
0.917***

0.573*
0.921***

0.534**
0.916***

0.567**
0.921***

0.517***

0.438***

0.515***

0.437***

0.833***
0.901**
0.00307***
0.0161***

0.860***
0.925*
0.00937***
0.0498**

0.835***
0.910**
0.00971***
0.0509**

0.857***
0.926*
0.0144***
0.0765*

Observations
1,632
1,632
1,632
1,632
Pseudo R2
0.0345
0.0432
0.0348
0.0441
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable: Recall (CPR): 0 "Mayor was not part of a recall process" 1
"Mayor was part of a recall process, but not revoked" 2 "Mayor was part of a recall process and revoked".

48

Table 1.16 Tests of the parallel regression assumption
Chi2

df

P>Chi2

Model 1
Wolfe Gould
Brant
score
likelihood ratio
Wald

13.11
11.43
13.31
13.09
14.12

10
10
10
10
10

0.218
0.325
0.207
0.219
0.168

Model 2
Wolfe Gould
Brant
score
likelihood ratio
Wald

14.18
13.59
16.26
15.72
16.99

11
11
11
11
11

0.223
0.256
0.132
0.152
0.108

Model 3
Wolfe Gould
Brant
score
likelihood ratio
Wald

12.29
10.38
12.34
12.23
12.90

10
10
10
10
10

0.266
0.408
0.263
0.270
0.229

Model 4
Wolfe Gould
Brant
score
likelihood ratio
Wald

13.32
11.99
14.41
14.15
14.77

11
11
11
11
11

0.273
0.364
0.211
0.225
0.193
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Table 1.17 Effect of fiscal and policy variables on probability of Mayors to be reelected –
(PROBIT and HECKMAN estimates)
Variables

MSW-Daily, 2011
Dropouts, primary edu. (%), 2013
Log of total exp. per capita, 2013
Exp. financed with Transfer (%), 2012
Log of total exp. per capita,
avg. 2012-2013
Log of exp. per capita financed
with Transfer, avg. 2012-2013
Same pol. org. that prov. Mayor in 2010
Mayor-Male
Number of candidates in 2010 local elec.
Log of Avg. of HH monthly
exp. per capita, 2013
Log of Altitude
Log of Area
Constant

(1)
probitModel 1
0.183*
(0.0955)
-0.0163
(0.0205)
0.209***
(0.0594)
-0.00470**
(0.00183)

-0.0296
(0.0931)
0.215
(0.211)
-0.0654***
(0.0169)
0.281**
(0.131)
-0.0424
(0.0301)
0.0289
(0.0313)
-2.910***
(0.985)

Selection equation (likely to run for
reelection)
Run for 2010 local elections
with a political party
Constant

(2)
probit
Model 2
0.182*
(0.0954)
-0.0188
(0.0205)

0.364***
(0.0998)
-0.217**
(0.0859)
-0.0203
(0.0930)
0.189
(0.211)
-0.0679***
(0.0172)
0.268**
(0.131)
-0.0371
(0.0303)
0.0384
(0.0315)
-2.886***
(1.000)

(3)
heckprobit
Model 1
0.110**
(0.0531)
-0.0144
(0.0113)
0.133***
(0.0339)
-0.00240**
(0.00102)

(4)
heckprobit
Model 2
0.105**
(0.0530)
-0.0161
(0.0112)

-0.0151
(0.0497)
0.0915
(0.104)
-0.0376***
(0.00817)
0.189**
(0.0738)
-0.0278
(0.0182)
0.0185
(0.0179)
-1.418**
(0.578)

0.219***
(0.0576)
-0.120**
(0.0523)
-0.00982
(0.0500)
0.0916
(0.105)
-0.0376***
(0.00826)
0.180**
(0.0731)
-0.0233
(0.0182)
0.0240
(0.0178)
-1.422**
(0.585)

0.170***
(0.0497)
0.259***
(0.0352)

0.169***
(0.0498)
0.259***
(0.0353)

-5.566***
(1.924)
1,632

-5.303***
(1.693)
1,632

Rho
Constant

Observations
1,632
1,632
Pseudo R2
0.0408
0.0378
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =
8.37
9.81
Prob > chi2 =
0.0038
0.0017
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables: REE (0=Lost on 2014 local
elections 1=Won on 2014 local elections).
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Table 1.18 Effect of fiscal and policy variables in probability of Mayors to be reelected
(OPROBIT and MPROBIT estimates)
Variables

MSW-Daily, 2011
Percentage of dropouts,
primary edu., 2013
Log of total exp. per
capita, 2013
Exp. financed with
Transfer (%), 2012
Log of total exp. per
capita, avg. 2012-2013
Log of Exp. per capita
financed with Transfer,
avg. 2012-2013
Same pol. org. that
prov. Mayor in 2010
Mayor- Male
Number of candidates
In 2010 local elections
Log of Avg. of HH
monthly exp. (n.s. per
capita), 2013
Log of Altitude
Log of Area
Constant cut1
Constant cut2

(1)
oprobitModel 1
0.160**
(0.0645)
-0.0235
(0.0143)
0.120***
(0.0411)
-0.00284**
(0.00129)

(2)
oprobit
Model 2
0.161**
(0.0645)
-0.0244*
(0.0143)

(3)
(4)
mprobit-Model 1
Didn’t run
Won
0.234**
0.254**
(0.108)
(0.118)
-0.0721***
-0.0248
(0.0236)
(0.0258)
-0.0490
0.250***
(0.0692)
(0.0742)
0.00131
-0.00579**
(0.00218)
(0.00231)

0.220***
(0.0727)
-0.135**
(0.0628)

(5)
(6)
mprobit-Model 2
Didn’t run
Won
0.235**
0.253**
(0.108)
(0.118)
-0.0719***
-0.0274
(0.0236)
(0.0258)

-0.143
(0.125)
0.106
(0.109)

0.429***
(0.126)
-0.252**
(0.108)

-0.000813
(0.0619)
0.233
(0.156)
-0.0539***
(0.0116)
0.239**
(0.0932)

0.00306
(0.0619)
0.216
(0.156)
-0.0557***
(0.0117)
0.232**
(0.0932)

0.0399
(0.103)
0.428
(0.263)
-0.0812***
(0.0193)
0.443***
(0.155)

-0.0278
(0.115)
0.305
(0.272)
-0.0870***
(0.0212)
0.369**
(0.167)

0.0366
(0.103)
0.436*
(0.263)
-0.0798***
(0.0195)
0.446***
(0.155)

-0.0178
(0.115)
0.272
(0.272)
-0.0906***
(0.0215)
0.349**
(0.167)

0.0107
(0.0216)
0.0268
(0.0218)
1.923***
(0.700)
2.979***
(0.702)

0.0140
(0.0219)
0.0323
(0.0220)
1.939***
(0.707)
2.994***
(0.708)

0.265***
(0.0380)
0.0605*
(0.0365)

-0.0362
(0.0377)
0.0399
(0.0392)

0.261***
(0.0384)
0.0555
(0.0369)

-0.0308
(0.0380)
0.0508
(0.0395)

-4.496***
(1.171)

-3.794***
(1.257)

-4.410***
(1.181)

-3.746***
(1.271)

Constant

Observations
1,632
1,632
1,632
1,632
1,632
1,632
Pseudo R2
0.0150
0.0143
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables: REE3 (0=didn’t run; 1=Run
but lost; 2=Run and won).
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Table 1.19 Testing the proportionality of odds assumption using the Likelihood Ratio
test
Variables

(1)
omodel
Model 1
0.239**
(0.0932)
0.0107
(0.0216)
0.0268
(0.0218)
-0.000813
(0.0619)
0.233
(0.156)
-0.0539***
(0.0116)
-0.0235
(0.0143)
0.160**
(0.0645)
0.120***
(0.0411)
-0.00284**
(0.00129)

Log of Avg. of HH monthly exp.
(n.s. per capita), 2013
Log of Altitude
Log of Area
Same political organization that
Provincial Mayor in 2010
Gender Mayor-Male
Number of candidates in 2010
local elections
Percentage of dropouts,
primary education, 2013
MSW-Daily, 2011
Log of total exp. per capita, 2013
Exp. financed with Transfers (%), 2012
Log of total exp. per capita,
avg. 2012-2013
Log of Exp. per capita financed
with Transfer, avg. 2012-2013
_cut1

1.923***
(0.700)
2.979***
(0.702)

_cut2

(2)
omodel
Model 2
0.232**
(0.0932)
0.0140
(0.0219)
0.0323
(0.0220)
0.00306
(0.0619)
0.216
(0.156)
-0.0557***
(0.0117)
-0.0244*
(0.0143)
0.161**
(0.0645)

0.220***
(0.0727)
-0.135**
(0.0628)
1.939***
(0.707)
2.994***
(0.708)

Observations
1,632
1,632
Pseudo R2
0.0150
0.0143
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of equality
chi2(10) = 97.74
chi2(10) = 99.45
of coefficients across response categories
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables: REE3 (0=didn’t run;
1=Run but lost; 2=Run and won).
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2
2.1

Improving interjurisdictional equalization
Introduction
One of the goals of fiscal decentralization is to provide equal access to public services

by citizens regardless of where they live in the country; simultaneously, one of the goals of
the general government is to reduce poverty and inequality. Accomplishing these goals is
partly restricted by the challenge of measuring the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of
subnational governments, particularly in a context of a great disparity.
An appropriate system of intergovernmental transfers could overcome the vertical54
and horizontal55 gaps associated with the mismatch between expenditures and revenues.
Intergovernmental transfers can also compensate the presence of externalities in the
provision of local public goods; finance those services that are considered priority by the
central government; and, provide incentives that will promote fiscal effort and efficiency in
spending. In particular, unconditional transfer mechanisms can either improve the vertical
fiscal balance by providing general-purpose funding at the subnational level or can improve
the horizontal fiscal balance by compensating for fiscal disparities across jurisdictions.
This essay approaches the question of how the allocation method of the two types of
transfers, described immediately below, affect the fiscal disparities between and within
subnational jurisdictions. The two types of transfers are (1) revenue-sharing transfers that
come from natural resource taxes and allocated on a derivation or origin basis; and, (2)
equalization transfers, specifically the one based on expenditure needs.

54

The expenditure needs of subnational governments arising from their functional competences exceed their
ability to self- finance them.
55
It is the result of the different tax capacities and economic bases of subnational governments and also of
different expenditure needs arising from differences in the costs of service delivery and differences in the
profiles and needs of the resident population.

53

We examined how the current structure of the Peruvian municipal equalization
transfer affects the fiscal disparities among the municipalities and how its effect can be
improved by making adjustments to the current allocation formula. The rest of this essay is
organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical arguments for the role of
intergovernmental transfers in reducing fiscal disparities. Section 2.3 describes the main
characteristics of the fiscal structure of the Peruvian municipalities and examine the fiscal
disparities by groups of revenue. Section 2.4 presents the main characteristics of the
Peruvian municipal equalization transfer (also called Municipal Compensation Fund or
FCM) and describes the variables and the allocation mechanism that are currently used to
distribute it. Section 2.5 introduces the alternative to allocate the FCM and the
methodology used to evaluate the current allocation versus the alternative. Section 2.6
presents the results and Section 2.7 concludes by drawing the lessons learned.
2.2

Role of intergovernmental transfers
The three potential economic objectives in providing transfers to subnational

governments are the internalization of cross-boundary or spillover effects to other
jurisdictions, equalize tax and/or service capacity across jurisdictions, and to improve the
overall tax system (Oates, 1999). In most decentralized systems, the expenditure
responsibilities of subnational governments are not fully covered by their own revenues
(Garman, Haggard, & Willis, 2001). Fiscal disparities among jurisdictions arise mainly
from the differences between their fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. Transfers are
mechanisms to address horizontal disparities, vertical imbalances and to correct for major
administrative weaknesses and streamline bureaucracy (Schroeder & Smoke, 2003). 56

56

Vertical imbalance happens when the expenditure needs of subnational governments exceed their ability to
finance them. Horizontal disparities are the result of the different tax capacities and economic bases of
subnational governments and also of different expenditure needs.

54

However, there is no guarantee that an intergovernmental transfer system will not have
contradictory effects. In this essay we focus on two specific types of transfers that may
present the unintended situation: (1) equalization transfers based on expenditure needs; and,
(2) revenue-sharing transfers that come from natural resource taxes, allocated on a
derivation basis and earmarked for investment.57
The rationale behind equalization transfers is to reduce the variation in horizontal
fiscal imbalances that may exist between subnational jurisdictions in a given country
(Reschovsky, 2007). This variation can be caused by differences in fiscal capacity58 and/or
in expenditures needs (or their associated costs)59 that correspond to differences in the
jurisdictions (Martinez-Vazquez & Sepúlveda, 2008).60 Usually, the equalization formula of
these transfers measures the “fiscal need” and “fiscal capacity” of each jurisdiction. These
formulas result in a disproportionate share of the transfers going to those jurisdictions with
the greatest fiscal need and the least fiscal capacity (Oates, 1999). Although the general
goal of this transfer is to equalize,61 its operationalization can be diverse, the equalization
can be based only on expenditure needs or fiscal capacity, or could consider both factors
(Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda, 2011b).62

57

Subnational finances in this Latin America generally rely on shared taxes with extensive earmarking (Ahmad
& Brosio, 2008).
58
This refers to their economic base which affects their ability to raise a particular level of revenue with
standard rates and administration effort.
59
Even when jurisdictions have the same fiscal capacity, they may differ in the costs due to differences in
demographic profiles, geographical and climatological conditions, incidence of poverty and unemployment
(Boex & Martinez-Vazquez, 2007).
60
The concepts described previously are formally established in the formula: 𝐹𝐷𝑖 = 𝐸𝑁𝑖 − 𝐹𝐶𝑖 , where fiscal
disparity (FDi) is equal to the difference between expenditure needs (ENi) and fiscal capacity (FCi) (i denotes
any jurisdiction). If the fiscal disparity of jurisdiction i is positive (negative) then the jurisdiction has less (more)
funds than required in order to cover its expenditure needs.
61
Since the objective of this transfer is to “equalize” rather than to affect local priorities, this transfer let the
subnational governments to spend the resources as they want (Borge, 2010).
62
Table 2.10 shows the diversity of equalization transfers in terms of their objectives.
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In the case of transfers by revenue sharing, there are no clear guidelines for the best
allocation (Martinez-Vazquez, 2013). An accepted economic argument for allocating at
least some of these resources under a geographic criterion is to compensate residents for the
pollution and environmental damage associated with the extraction of the natural resources.
However, the location of natural resources is not necessarily correlated with the relative
expenditure needs or fiscal capacities of the beneficiary governments. This situation creates
horizontal imbalances which raise inequality between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
(Martinez-Vazquez & Sepulveda, 2011b). This paper focuses on the effect of the
interaction of these two specific types of transfers on the fiscal disparities among local
governments by using information of Peru.
2.3

Fiscal capacity of Peruvian municipalities
Peru has a population of 31 million as of 2015 and approximately 31% of the

population lives in the capital city (Lima). The main economic activities are agriculture,
fisheries, mining, exploitation of oil and gas, and manufacturing of goods. The mining
industry is the sector with the greatest growth and contribution to the economy regarding
GDP, exports, and tax input.63 The country is composed of departments (or regions),
provinces and districts, which are the base for the political demarcation. There are three
major tiers of government: A national government, 26 regional governments and 1,843 local
governments (or municipalities). This last tier – the focus of our analysis – is divided into
196 provincial and 1,647 district municipalities.64

63

The value of mining exports doubled in the 1990s and then rose by more than seven times in the following
decade. By the early 2010s, the value of Peru’s mining exports averaged nearly 25 billion US dollars, or 14% of
GDP and over 50% of total exports. Source: http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/statistics/annual-tables.html. The GDP per
capita has expanded from USD 3,311 in 2000 to USD 6,089 in 2016 (values express in constant 2010 US$).
Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=PE.
64
The number of districts have been increasing the last years, the sample considered for the second paper
corresponds to the latest information in 2014.
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The country has been undergoing a decentralization process since 2002 with the
expectation that it will promote efficiency in the public administration and bettercoordinated policies. Despite the progress in areas like transparency, citizens’ participation
and transfer of responsibilities, the decentralization process has not enhanced the ability of
local governments to generate their own revenues or provided the right incentives to
develop revenue autonomy (Ahmad & García-Escribano, 2011; Martinez-Vazquez, 2013).
Subsections 1.3.2, 1.3.5 and 1.3.6 in the first essay describe the main characteristics of the
local governments’ expenditure structure, revenue structure and intergovernmental
transfers, but as a recap, we address their main characteristics.
2.3.1 Expenditure structure
The central government has issued several laws to set the expenditure responsibilities
of subnational governments, which were assigned shared and exclusive competences.
However, one of the challenges in the transfer of expenditures responsibilities has been the
wording of the regulation. Many functions overlap between levels of government and
provide numerous functions with little clarity in their definition (see Table 2.1).65 Also, the
requirements for the use of funds on capital expenditures are likely to have a negative
impact on the efficiency and quality of public services (Martinez-Vazquez, 2013). The slow
execution of funds, especially those coming from the exploitation of natural resources, is
related with the requirement to use those funds for capital infrastructure; the rush to disburse
has been hurting overall expenditure efficiency (World Bank, 2010b).

For example, in the case of education, regional governments have the function to: “formulate, approve,
execute, evaluate and administer the education, culture, science and technology, sports and recreation regional
policies for the region” and to “design, execute and evaluate the regional educational project, the culture
development programs, science and technology, and the sports and recreation development program” while
local governments function is to: “design, execute and evaluate the educational project of their jurisdiction, in
co-ordination with the Regional Education Office and the Local Education Management Unit and contribute to
the national and regional educational policy with an intersectional action focus” (OECD, 2016).
65
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2.3.2 Revenue structure
The fiscal capacity of Peruvian municipalities –understood as the revenues they can
generate– comes from user charges66 and taxes67. However, local governments do not have
autonomy to either define the tax bases or set the rates for the taxes assigned them. Therefore,
local discretion is constrained to the realm of tax administration and enforcement efforts.

The local taxation exhibits a low efficiency due to the lack of capacity of the
municipalities. In the case of the property tax, many municipalities do not have a complete
cadaster of properties or the existing ones are not updated (Alfaro & Rühling, 2007). In
addition, the structure and administration of the tax offers several exemptions to areas used
by the public sector, non-profit organizations and for agriculture. Also, it is common
practice to reduce or forgive penalties to those that do not pay the tax.68
Table 2.4 shows how in the aggregate, tax revenues are slightly higher than revenues
from user charges. If we analyze the structure of own revenues per capita, we find a
significant variation by type of municipality and type of revenue (see Table 2.5, Table 2.6
and Table 2.7). The coefficient of variation in own revenues (tax and non-tax) per capita
stands at a rather high level of 2.2 for provincial municipalities and 2.3 for district
municipalities. If we distinguish between tax and non-tax revenue, we notice that tax
revenues per capita have bigger disparity (4.2 for provincial municipalities and 4.3 for
district municipalities) than user charges per capita (1.7 for provincial municipalities and
2.2 for district municipalities).

66

It includes street cleaning, road tolls, parks maintenance, public safety services, and construction permits.
The Law Decree No. 776 (1993) establishes taxes on property as the main tax revenue for provincial and
district municipalities. Provincial municipalities are assigned the tax on vehicle property, and district
municipalities are assigned the tax on land and buildings and the tax on property transfers. There is also a set of
national taxes that correspond to the municipalities but are collected by the central government. The main
characteristics of the tax revenue assignment can be seen in Table 2.2.
68
The structure of penalties is the same across municipalities, amounting by law to 50% of the tax due if not
paid by the deadline; however, municipalities can grant additional discounts.
67
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2.3.3 Revenue disparities among municipalities
We run three regressions to explore the characteristics of municipalities own revenues
(see Table 2.8). We analyze the revenues as a total and by components (tax or non-tax
revenues) because of the higher costs and skills associated with the collection of taxes in
comparison to charges and user fees. This analysis does not attempt to explain the
determinants of municipalities own revenues, but to understand which variables can predict
their differences. Considering the heterogeneity of the country, we explore those aspects
that challenge the provision of goods and services.
The urbanization rate and the size of the territory are variables used in the assignment
of the Peruvian equalization transfer under the assumption that both aspects challenge the
provision of basic services to remote populations. The urban rate has a positive and
significant association in the three specifications. The same situation happens with the
territory which is positively associated with tax and non-tax revenues (separately and
jointly). An interesting finding was the opposite effect of altitude, it shows a negative
association with tax revenues, but it has a positive association with non-tax revenues.
Also, the results highlight the structural differences between Lima province and the
rest of the country. In the same way, provincial municipalities have better fiscal
performance than district municipalities. We include the log of the average household
spending per capita and a dummy variable takes the value of one for all districts where
there was any taxpaying mineral (mainly copper, gold, and silver) production between
2009 and 2014. Both variables are positive and significant in all the specifications showing
the fiscal potential of the municipalities.
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2.3.4 Intergovernmental transfers
There are two major types of transfers:69 the first type comes from revenue sharing
arrangements derived from the exploitation of natural resources among the central
government and subnational governments (Canon). This transfer is not very stable due to
the volatility of natural resource prices in international markets and its use -which is
earmarked for capital expenditure. Also, it is allocated on a derivation basis, this situation
has created administrative pressure in those municipalities that experienced a significant
increase in the resources and do not have the technical capacity to use them.70
The second type of transfer is the Municipal Equalization Transfer (FCM) which is
based on expenditure needs and managerial performance criteria and has the purpose to
ensure the functioning of all municipalities. Before the implementation of the Canon, FCM
represented the main source of revenues for most municipalities. However, as a result of
Peru’s mining boom, the Canon has grown substantially (see Table 2.3).71
2.4

Municipal Compensation Fund (FCM)
The Municipal Compensation Fund (FCM) was established in the Peruvian

Constitution in 1994 with the goal of promoting investment in local governments.72 The
resources distributed by the FCM are mainly determined by the collection of the Municipal
Promotion Tax (IPM) which is closely linked to the performance of the general sales tax
(VAT). In 2010, the authorities changed the FCM allocation methodology to take into

69

More details of the transfers are shown in 1.3.6.
In addition, the beneficiaries have developed a strong sentiment of entitle that could create social tension. In
2009, the Ombudsman’s office reported 268 social conflicts, of which 38% were related to mining activities
71
In 2007, the FCM represented 32.9% of districts’ budget and the Canon 21.4% (excluding the Region of
Lima) (Loayza, Mier y Teran, & Rigolini, 2013).
72
. The article 76 of the Legislative Decree No 776 sets that the IPM is levied at a rate of 2% over the operations
affected by the VAT. Therefore, the monthly allocation of FCM is directly related to the performance of the tax
revenue of the previous month; when the revenue increases, the allocation of the following month increases and
when the levy is reduced, the municipalities receive a lower allocation.
70
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account a broader set of unmet needs.73 The goal of this change in the methodology was to
promote equity in transfers of resources to the municipalities.74 Based on its formula, the
FCM includes characteristics of a lump-sum grant and also of a matching grant.
2.4.1 Challenges associated with FCM
The main concern about transfers is their effect in local governments’ fiscal effort.
Several studies have been done about this subject in the country, although the results have
been ambiguous. Earlier studies by Alvarado Perez (1994); Alvarado et al. (2003); Aragon
and Gayoso (2005) suggest that devolving responsibilities to sub-national governments
might reduce fiscal effort and deteriorate fiscal balance especially among localities with
lower fiscal capacity. On the other hand, Rabanal Sobrino and Castillo (2006) suggested that
transfers can improve the fiscal capacity of local governments; however, the effect seems to
be lower among those municipalities that receive transfers from Canon.
More recent studies (Martinez-Vazquez & Sepulveda, 2011a) found a negative
correlation between the current transfers (FCM) and property tax collections.75 This is later
confirmed by Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2012) who, using different econometric techniques,
also found a negative and significant correlation between the FCM and tax revenues. On the
other hand, the transfers from Canon had a positive effect on the level of the non-tax
component of revenue collections (charges and user fees).76

73

The new methodology includes measures of municipal management such as the fiscal effort of municipalities
and the extent to which they are prioritizing public investment to allocate funds among different municipalities
within a given province (Supreme Decree No. 060-2010-EF).
74
The Government has also created the Incentive Plan to Improve Municipal Management (PI) through Law No
29332. This plan aims to incentivize Local Governments to improve municipal tax collection levels as well
spending on investment and reduce chronic childhood malnutrition.
75
However, they warn about the potential endogeneity bias in the estimates because lower property tax revenues
per capita may also induce larger current intergovernmental transfers per capita. On the other hand, they also
found that capital intergovernmental transfers (Canon) are not statistically significant.
76
They speculate that it might be related to a greater capacity of sub-national governments to provide public
services for which they can charge and, with greater demand for these services, and/or with greater ability to pay
on the part of the population. In contrast, revenues from Canon seem to have little or no effect on tax collections.
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The evidence suggested the presence of perverse incentives created by the equalization
transfer that comes from not recognizing the municipalities’ fiscal capacities to use their tax
bases. The potential revenues come not only from the transfers from extractive industries
(Canon), but also from their economic base. In this context, we reviewed the current
structure and allocation formula of the FCM and proposed some changes. A
recommendation that is explored in this essay is the inclusion of the fiscal capacity by
considering the resources that municipalities received from Canon.77 The idea is to
significantly reduce the FCM funds from those local governments that receive a significant
share of the Canon funds.
2.4.2 Current allocation methodology of FCM
The allocation of FCM comprises three phases (see Figure 2.1), the first phase
defines the allocation to the provinces, the second phase defines the allocation to the
districts and the third phase adjust the allocation that results from the previous steps.
The first phase is defined as the “Geographical allocation to the provinces” (IGPj).
The total national FCM “pool of funds” is divided into 196 parts, which are the 196
geographical provinces that make up the country. The allocation by province uses an
index combining the population of the province (Popj) and the index of unmet needs for
public services (ICj) at the province level.78 The index is calculated as:
𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑗 =

𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗 × 𝐼𝐶𝑗
196
∑𝑗=1 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗 × 𝐼𝐶𝑗

2.1

After determining the allocation to the province in the first phase, the next phase is
the distribution within the province. This is called “Inter-district allocation” (INDk).

77

The term Canon refers to several transfers. The allocation and distribution procedure of these transfers are
explained in Table 2.9.
78
The ICj is the simple average of the percentage of people in province j with no access to water (NoWj),
sewage (NoSj) nor electricity (NoEj).
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20% of the amount assigned to the province is transferred to the provincial
municipality79 and the other 80% is distributed among all the districts of the province
including the district where the provincial municipality is located. It includes 3 factors:
(i) rurality (IRk); (ii) territorial extension (Terrk); and, (iii) municipal management
(IGMk).80
i) Rurality index (IRk): The index is the weighted summation of the rural (Rurk)
and urban (Urbk) population of the district (the rural population has a double weight).
For the districts located in MML and Callao provinces, instead of the rurality index, it is
used the poverty index based on the population (Popk) and the unmet basic needs (NBIk)
of the district.81 The corresponding index is:
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑘 × 𝑁𝐵𝐼𝑘
𝑛
∑𝑘=1 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑘 × 𝑁𝐵𝐼𝑘

𝐼𝑅𝑘 =
{

, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑀𝐿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒

2.2

1 × 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑘 + 2 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑘
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠
× 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑘 + 2 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑘

∑𝑛𝑘=1 1

ii) Territorial extension index (Terrk): This index aims to compensate districts that due
to their territorial extension have difficulties providing basic services to their more remote
populations.82 The formula of the index is:
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑘 =

𝐾𝑚𝑘2
∑𝑛𝑘=1 𝐾𝑚𝑘2
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2.3

District where the provincial municipality is located.
Each of these factors represents an index itself that adds one for each province.
81
The NBIi is the summation of the following indicators: households with inadequate housing (NBI1), without
access to water service (NBI2), without access to sewage service (NBI3), households with children between 6 to
12 years old who do not attend school (NBI4) and households with very low economic capacity (NBI5).
82
The Legislative Decree No. 952 (2004) modified the Legislative Decree No. 776 – Municipal Taxation Law.
80
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iii) Municipal Management (IGMk):83 The index for the district is the simple average
of two factors that consider the generation of own revenues (ripk) and the prioritization of
spending in investment (ripgik).
𝐼𝐺𝑀𝑘 =

𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑘 + 𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑘
2

2.4

The first factor is calculated on the basis of the index of generation of own revenues
(IPk) which considers the revenues collected on the district in the last two years. 84 The final
index ripk is the ratio of IPk relative to the summation of the index for all the districts in the
corresponding province.
𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑘 = [

𝐼𝑃𝑘
]
∑𝑛𝑘=1 𝐼𝑃𝑘

𝑂𝑤𝑟𝑡−1
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡−1
𝐼𝑃𝑘 = [1 + ( 1 + 𝑂𝑤𝑟
)]
𝑡−2
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡−2

2.5
0.1

Likewise, the second factor is calculated on the basis of the spending prioritization
index (IPGIk) which considers the acquisition of non-financial assets financed with FCM
(AnfaFCM) and the total spending financed with FCM in the district (GtotFCM). The final
index ripgik is the ratio of spending prioritization index relative to the summation of the
index for all the districts in the corresponding province.
𝐼𝑃𝐺𝐼𝑘
]
∑𝑛𝑘=1 𝐼𝑃𝐺𝐼𝑘
𝐴𝑛𝑓𝑎
𝐼𝑃𝐺𝐼𝑘 = (1 + 𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑡 𝐹𝐶𝑀 )
𝐹𝐶𝑀

2.6

𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑘 = [

The allocation index for the district set in the second phase is:
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘 = 𝐼𝑅𝑘 × 0.85 + 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑘 × 0.05 + 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝑘 × 0.10

83

2.7

The municipal management index is based on the Article 32 of Legislative Decree No. 952 that modifies the
Legislative Decree No. 776 Municipal Taxation Law.
84
In the case of the own revenues index (IPk), before the data is converted into an index, a numeric
transformation is done through which these numbers are converted to a scale between 1 and 2.
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The third phase adjusts the district allocation to set a “floor value”. The amount
obtained on the second phase is adjusted to be at least equivalent to 8 tax units. The
difference between the amount obtained in the second phase and the 8 tax units (UIT) is
considered a deficit or a surplus, depending on the case. The total surplus is used to fill the
total deficit and what remains is reassigned to the districts that originally have a surplus
adjusted by a factor equal to the total sum of surpluses minus the total sum of deficits
divided by the total sum of surpluses (RA8UIT). In this step, the amount assigned
exclusively to the provincial municipality is not part of the adjustment.85 With the
adjustment ratio RA8UIT, we calculate the adjusted monthly allocation FCMk where
Surplusk (Deficitk) is the positive (negative) difference between the preliminary monthly
allocation of FCM and 8 UIT in district k and s (d) is the number of districts in surplus
(deficit).
𝐹𝐶𝑀𝑘 = {

8𝑈𝐼𝑇 + 𝑅𝐴8𝑈𝐼𝑇 × 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑘 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠
8𝑈𝐼𝑇
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡

Where: 𝑅𝐴8𝑈𝐼𝑇 =

2.8

∑𝑠𝑘=1 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑘 +∑𝑑
𝑘=1 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑘
∑𝑠𝑘=1 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑘

The amount obtained after the 8 UIT adjustment is adjusted again to be at least
equivalent to the adjusted allocation of FCM on 2009. The adjustment is made following
the same criteria used to make the adjustment relative to the 8 UIT. In this step, the amount
assigned exclusively to the provincial municipality (the 20% allocation of the province) is
also adjusted to be at least the amount assigned on 2009.86

This legal “minimum” is established by the Article 33 of Legislative Decree No. 952 which modifies the
Legislative Decree No. 776 – Municipal Taxation Law.
86
The index that results from the third phase represents the allocation under a neutral scenario (B). The index
also includes a pessimistic (A) and optimistic (C) scenario that are adjusted each year. In the case of 2014, the
scenario A is when the monthly collection is less than 335 million of new soles, scenario B is when the monthly
collection is between 335 and 373 million of new soles and scenario C when the monthly collection is higher
than 373 million. The simulation has been performed for scenario B, in other words, the 373 million represents
the pool of funds to which the index is applied.
85
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2.5

Alternative methodology: incorporating fiscal capacity
As it is set in Figure 2.1, we proposed to include an index called “Fiscal Capacity Gap

Index” (FCGj) in the first phase. The fiscal capacity is measured by all the transfers funds
received at the province level (TRj), including the Canon and other transfers of similar
nature (but excluding the FCM itself) plus potential own revenues which are calculated
̂𝑗 ). The components are further explained in what follows.
using a regression analysis (𝐼𝑃
Transfers: We add all components of the item “transfers” (except for the FCM)
received by each province. TRj is the total transfers receive by province j, n is the number
of districts that are part of province j and TRk is total transfers receive by district k. TRk
represents the summation of all transfers received by district k which includes Canonk; 87
and other transfers (Othersk).88
𝑛

𝑇𝑅𝑗 = ∑

𝑇𝑅𝑘

2.9

𝑘=1

Where: 𝑇𝑅𝑘 = 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑘 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑘
Estimating potential own revenues: we first calculate actual own revenues for each
district k, then we estimate the per capita own revenues (IPpck). Owrk and Popk are the
own revenues and population of district k.
𝐼𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑘 =

𝑂𝑤𝑟𝑘
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑘

2.10

Then, in order to estimate potential own revenues per capita we run a regression for
all districts having as a dependent variable the own revenues per capita IPpck and as an
independent variable the average household private expenses in each district expressed in

87

Summation of forest canon, gas canon, hydro-energetic canon, mining canon, fishing canon, oil canon and
sobrecanon, mining royalties and custom duties.
88
Includes other transfers like FOCAM, FONIE, participations and other transfers.
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per capita terms.89 We run this regression using the information for 2013, the year for
which we have the most recent information (see Table 2.11). Subsequently, it is used the
regression parameter to predict the values of the district own revenues per capita for the
̂ 𝑘 . In the case that the predicted value is negative, the district is
year of the analysis 𝐼𝑃𝑝𝑐
̂ 𝑘 is the predicted value of own revenues per capita of district
assigned a value of zero. 𝐼𝑃𝑝𝑐
k; 𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑝𝑐𝑘 is the average household private expenses express in per capita terms for
̂𝑘 is the predicted value of own revenues of district k.
district k and 𝐼𝑃
̂𝑘 < 0
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑃𝑝𝑐
̂𝑘 = {
𝐼𝑃𝑝𝑐
0.563 × 𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑝𝑐𝑘 − 129.563,

2.11
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

̂𝑘 = 𝐼𝑃𝑝𝑐
̂𝑘 × 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑘
𝐼𝑃
To calculate the potential own revenues at the province level, we sum the predicted
value of own revenues for all districts including the provincial municipality.
𝑛

2.12

̂𝑗 = ∑ 𝐼𝑃
̂𝑘
𝐼𝑃
𝑘=1

The fiscal capacity of the province j is thus defined as the revenues coming from all
̂𝑗 :
transfers -except FCM (TRj) plus the potential own revenues 𝐼𝑃
̂𝑗
𝐹𝐶𝑗 = 𝑇𝑅𝑗 + 𝐼𝑃
𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑗 =

𝐹𝐶𝑗
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗

2.13
2.14

Calculating the fiscal capacity gap (fcgj): In this step we first calculate the national
average fiscal capacity per capita (FCpcna) and then we calculate the fiscal capacity gap
per capita for each province relative to this national average as follows:

89

This approach can be complemented by estimating the municipal own revenues using the provincial measure
of household spending, plus municipal characteristics such as urbanization, altitude. The focus in this paper is to
understand the fiscal variation within provinces and between-provinces.
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0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑛𝑎 < 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑗
𝑓𝑐𝑔𝑗 = {
(𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑛𝑎 − 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑗 ) × 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗 , 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑛𝑎 > 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑗

2.15

Therefore, only the provinces that have a lower per capita fiscal capacity than the
national average are eligible for this component of the index. The fiscal capacity index of
the province (FCGj) is defined as its share in the total fiscal capacity gap of all qualifying
provinces.
𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑗 =

𝑓𝑐𝑔𝑗
196
∑𝑗=1 𝑓𝑐𝑔𝑗

2.16

Calculating the adjusted allocation index for the province (APIj): The information on
the fiscal capacity gap index 𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑗 is combined with the original provincial allocation index
𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑗 to estimate the proposed provincial allocation index. Both criteria are pro-poor and
other combinations of weights could be simulated to arrive to more (or less) redistributive
outcomes. We give the original index IGPj a weight of 70% and the added fiscal capacity
index FCGj a weight of 30%.
𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑗 = 0.7 × 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑗 + 0.3 × 𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑗
2.6

2.17

Results
The paper analyses the fiscal disparities in revenue of local government due to the

FCM under the current structure and the proposed alternative. The units of analysis are all
the municipalities that received FCM in 2014. To evaluate the differences between the
current and alternative allocation methodology of FCM, we estimate the Mean log
deviation (I0) and the Squared coefficient of variation (I2).
The alternative methodology proposes province-level indicators for allocation of
grants to districts; therefore, it ignores the within-province inequality. These measures
allow to identify the disparities that happen between and within provinces; identify the
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relative contribution of different revenue sources. In addition, they differ in their
sensitivity to inequality in different parts of the distribution, while I0 is most sensitive to
disparities in the bottom range of the distribution, I2 gives more weight to disparities in the
upper tail of the distribution (Martinez-Vazquez & Timofeev, 2008).
2.6.1 Disparities in per capita revenue of local governments
𝑛

We estimate and decompose the Mean log deviation 𝐼0 = 𝐼0𝑏 + 𝐼0𝑤 : ∑𝑗 𝑁𝑗 (ln 𝑦̅ −
ln 𝑦̅𝑗 ) + ∑𝑗 ∑𝑘
𝐼2𝑤 :

𝑛𝑗𝑘
𝑁

1
∑ 𝑛
(𝑁−1)𝑦̅ 2 𝑗 𝑗

(ln 𝑦̅𝑘 − ln 𝑦𝑗𝑘 ) and the Squared coefficient of deviation 𝐼2 = 𝐼2𝑏 +
2

2

1

(𝑦̅𝑗 − 𝑦̅) + (𝑁−1)𝑦̅ 2 ∑𝑗 ∑𝑘 𝑛𝑗𝑘 (𝑦𝑗𝑘 − 𝑦̅𝑘 ) where N is total population of

the country; 𝑛𝑗 is population of province j; 𝑛𝑗𝑘 is the population of district k in province j;
𝑦̅𝑗 is province j’s mean value of variables 𝑦𝑗𝑘 and 𝑦̅ is the grand mean of variable 𝑦𝑗𝑘 .
We use this structure to estimate I0 and I2 for 4 categories of revenues: own revenues;
plus transfers; plus other revenues; and, plus FCM (see Table 2.12). The results confirm
the great differences in per capita revenues before cumulatively adding the transfers and
other revenues. Most of the disparity occurs within provinces, especially for own-source
revenues. Even though the disparity is lessened after adding the transfers, the table shows
the increase in the disparity between provinces. The disparities are lessened after the
allocation of FCM, mostly on the disparities between provinces.
2.6.2 Effect of the alternative methodology
The effect of the inclusion of the fiscal capacity index in the FCM formula depends
on the application of the no harm measure or “floor value” adjustments done in the third
phase. With the current formula of FCM, the allocation index (the second phase), changes
when the floor value adjustments are implemented (third phase). For example, the district
of Yarabamba (located in the province of Arequipa in Arequipa region) should receive
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29,560 new sols as a monthly assignment for FCM if we applied the index that results
from the second phase. However, that amount is less than the 8 UIT and the adjusted
amount they received in 2009. So in the end, the district receives 30,800 new sols (the
adjusted amount they received in 2009).
Our initial alternative (Alt 2.4) only affects the allocation corresponding to the first
phase; however, after performing the third phase allocation adjustment, it is hard to
guarantee that the allocation corresponding to the first remains. In order to extend the
analysis we add three more alternatives that consider the variation in the first phase and
variations in the application of the third phase. The alternative 2.1 (Alt 2.1) corresponds to
the case where none of the no-harm criteria is applied; the alternative 2.2 (Alt 2.2)
represents the case where only the floor value of the adjusted allocation on 2009 is applied;
and, the alternative 2.3 (Alt 2.3) represents the case where only the floor value of 8 UIT is
applied. The Table 2.13 shows the disparities in per capita revenues after applying the
current formula of FCM and the alternatives. All the alternatives seem to marginal lessened
the disparities between provinces relative to the current formula of FCM; however, they
also increase the disparities within provinces.
2.7

Conclusions
An intergovernmental transfer system is an important component of the fiscal

decentralization policy; however, it is not immune to present contradictory effects. This
paper aimed at investigating how revenue-sharing and equalization transfers affect fiscal
disparities considering the case of Peruvian local governments. Both transfers have a
significant weight in their budget, but the design of the revenue-sharing transfer -allocated
on a derivation basis- has caused an increased in the disparity among local governments.
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Considering the great political cost involved in adjusting the revenue-sharing transfer,
a possible strategy is to look for an indirect reform by adjusting the equalization transfer.
The paper investigated whether fiscal disparities among districts can be reduced when the
allocation formula of the equalization transfer is modified by incorporating a revenue
capacity component and by removing the “no harmful” adjustment steps.
The alternatives indicate a reduction in the disparities between and within provinces in
the lower tail of the distribution (I0), but they increased the disparity within provinces in
the upper tail (I2). The results are expected considering that the alternatives are meant to
adjust only the amount that is allocated to the province. Future research can include other
variables to increase the explanatory power of the model use to estimate the potential
revenues of the districts as well as considering adjustments in the allocation within the
province.
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Table 2.1 Allocation of responsibilities by level of government

Exclusive

Shared

Central government

Regional governments

Local governments

Foreign relations
Defense, national security,
and armed forces
Justice, with the exception
of Justice administration
Internal order, national
and border police
Tax administration of
national scope and
national public borrowing
Foreign trade and tariff
policy
Regulation of merchant
marine and commercial
air transport
Regulation of public
services
Regulation of public
infrastructure of national
scope
Any others set by law in
accordance with the
Constitution
Design and supervision of
national and sectoral
policies, which are
compulsory for all levels
of government
All other responsibilities

Regional development
plans and executing
corresponding socioeconomic programs
Internal organization of the
regional government
Promote and implement
public investment of
regional scope in roads,
communications, and basic
services
Development of tourism
circuits
Administer state land
within their jurisdiction
(except municipal land)
Demarcation of territorial
limits within the region
Modernization of small
and medium enterprises
Promote sustainable use of
forestry and biodiversity
resources

Urban and rural municipal
development
Management and regulation of
local public services
Internal organization of the local
government
Local development plan
Execution and monitoring of local
public infrastructure

Education: management of
education services for preschool, primary,
secondary, and higher
education (except
university)
Public health
Regulation of economic
activities in their sphere
Sustainable management of
natural resources and
improving the environment
Preserving and
administering regional
natural reserves
Culture and arts
Regional competitiveness
and job promotion
Citizens’ participation

Education: take part in
management of education services
as would be determined in the
sectoral law
Public health
Culture, tourism, recreation, and
sports
Security (seguridad ciudadana)
Monument conservation
Public transport and traffic
Housing and urban rehabilitation
Service and management of social
programs
Management of social programs
Waste management

Source: (World Bank, 2010b)
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Table 2.2 Main characteristics of municipal tax revenue assignments
Revenue shares
Districts
Provinces

Tax rates

District administration:
Land and buildings

100% (5% for
cadaster
maintenance)

0%

< 15 UIT: 0.2% (or 0.6%)
15-60 UIT: 0.6%
> 60 UIT: 1.0%

50%

50% (to Municipal
Investment Fund)

3% (first 3 UIT exempted)

Games (pinball,
bingo, etc)

100%

0%

10%

Public shows

100%

0%

Bullfighting: 5%
Horse racing: 10%
Others: 15%

0%

100%

1% (minimum: 1.5% UIT)

40%

60%

20% (horse racing: 12%)

Property transfers

Provincial administration:
Vehicle property
Bets

Games (lotteries)
0%
100%
10%
Notes: The Law Decree No. 776 establishes taxes on property as the main tax revenue sources
for municipalities. There is also a set of national taxes that correspond to the municipalities but
are collected by the central government which later transfer to them. UIT or “Tributary Tax
Unit” is a monetary measure used to set the value of taxes, fees, penalties and other legal
payments equivalent to 3,950 new soles in 2016 (US$ 1,170 on December 24, 2015).
Source: (Gomez et al., 2010).
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Table 2.3 Revenue composition of local governments, 2004-2014 (as % of GDP)

Own revenues
Property tax/0
Other tax revenues
Nontax revenues/1

2004
0.91
0.23
0.06
0.62

2005
0.91
0.25
0.05
0.61

2006
0.74
0.22
0.04
0.48

2007
0.84
0.30
0.04
0.50

2008
0.91
0.32
0.05
0.54

2009
0.97
0.33
0.06
0.58

2010
0.88
0.34
0.05
0.49

2011
0.88
0.35
0.05
0.48

2012
0.95
0.39
0.05
0.51

2013
0.93
0.41
0.06
0.47

2014
0.89
0.39
0.05
0.44

Transfers
Canon/2
FCM
Other transfers

1.47
0.38
0.76
0.33

1.65
0.66
0.79
0.20

1.78
0.91
0.81
0.05

2.73
1.71
0.86
0.16

2.66
1.53
0.92
0.22

2.08
1.17
0.82
0.09

2.29
1.14
0.78
0.37

2.52
1.37
0.80
0.35

2.60
1.50
0.82
0.28

2.35
1.26
0.82
0.28

2.19
1.08
0.86
0.25

Capital revenues/3

0.15

0.08

0.10

0.09

0.11

0.21

0.24

0.15

0.21

0.17

0.31

Total
2.53
2.64
2.62
3.67
3.68
3.27
/0 includes vehicle property, property transfer and land and buildings property.
/1 Includes fees, rental of property, service charges, sales of goods, fines and others.
/2 includes canon, sobrecanon, royalties, customs duties and concession rights.
/3 Includes sales of assets and capital transfers.
Source: Ministry of Finance.

3.41

3.56

3.75

3.45

3.39
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Table 2.4 Revenue structure of local governments, 2004-2014 (%)
2004
36
9
2
24

2005
34
9
2
23

2006
28
8
1
18

2007
23
8
1
14

2008
25
9
1
15

2009
30
10
2
18

2010
26
10
1
14

2011
25
10
1
14

2012
25
10
1
14

2013
27
12
2
14

2014
26
12
2
13

58
15
30
13

63
25
30
8

68
35
31
2

75
47
24
4

72
41
25
6

64
36
25
3

67
33
23
11

71
39
22
10

69
40
22
8

68
36
24
8

65
32
25
7

6

3

4

3

3

6

7

4

5

5

9

Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
/0 includes vehicle property, property transfer and land and buildings property.
/1 Includes fees, rental of property, service charges, sales of goods, fines and others.
/2 includes canon, sobrecanon, royalties, customs duties and concession rights.
/3 Includes sales of assets and capital transfers.
Source: Ministry of Finance.

100

100

100

100

100

Own revenues
Property tax/0
Other tax revenues
Nontax revenues/1
Transfers
Canon/2
FCM
Other transfers
Capital revenues/3
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Table 2.5 Own revenue per capita by type of municipality (in new sols of 2014)

Provincial municipalities/1
Max
Min
St. Dev
Average
CoV
# of provincial municipalities

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2,822
3
247
118
2.09
195

3,328
3
276
129
2.14
195

3,695
3
299
131
2.28
195

4,428
0
361
146
2.47
195

3,823
5
404
173
2.34
195

3,589
0
366
165
2.22
195

District municipalities
Max
5,414 4,766 2,566 2,954 2,995
3,182
Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
St. Dev
223
243
183
193
215
219
Average
75
85
81
86
95
95
CoV
2.96
2.86
2.26
2.25
2.27
2.31
# of district municipalities
1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637
1,637
/1 The amounts are divided by the population of the districts where the provincial municipality
is located.
Source: Ministry of Finance.
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Table 2.6 Tax revenue per capita by type of municipality (in new sols of 2014)
2009
Provincial municipalities/1
Max
Min
St. Dev
Average
CoV
# of province municipalities

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

1,398 1,794 1,963 2,362
0
0
0
0
103
133
146
176
26
32
35
41
4.01 4.11 4.13 4.35
195
195
195
195

2,527
0
245
55
4.45
195

2,418
0
223
53
4.20
195

District municipalities
Max
5,039 4,642 1,206 1,435
1,512
1,620
Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
St. Dev
138
156
73
79
93
93
Average
16
21
18
19
22
22
CoV
8.50 7.49 4.11 4.14
4.24
4.26
# of district municipalities
1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637
1,637
1,637
/1 The amounts are divided by the population of the districts where the provincial municipality
is located.
Source: Ministry of Finance.
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Table 2.7 Non-tax revenue per capita by type of municipality (in new sols of 2014)
2009
Provincial municipalities/1
Max
Min
St. Dev
Average
CoV
# of province municipalities

2010

1,425 1,534
2
2
171
173
92
97
1.85 1.78
195
195

2011

2012

2013

2014

1,732 2,066 1,855
2
0
4
174
219
227
95
106
118
1.82 2.07 1.93
195
195
195

1,347
0
194
112
1.74
195

District municipalities
Max
2,958 3,218 2,193 2,458 2,020
2,338
Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
St. Dev
146
160
138
145
152
157
Average
59
64
63
67
73
73
CoV
2.47 2.49
2.19 2.17 2.09
2.16
# of district municipalities
1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637
1,637
/1 The amounts are divided by the population of the districts where the provincial municipality
is located.
Source: Ministry of Finance.
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Table 2.8 Characteristics of local governments own revenues, 2014

Variables

Log of average household spending per capita, 2013
Producing Districts
Provincial municipality
Lima province
Urban rate (%)
Log of Area (square kilometers)
Log of Altitude (meters)
Constant

(1)
(2)
Log of Total own
Log of Tax
revenue per capita revenue per capita
1.782***
(0.121)
0.853***
(0.116)
0.213*
(0.110)
0.919***
(0.229)
0.00984***
(0.00145)
0.163***
(0.0254)
0.127***
(0.0235)
-9.448***
(0.785)

2.334***
(0.0962)
0.210**
(0.0919)
0.644***
(0.0874)
0.927***
(0.182)
0.00454***
(0.00115)
0.0320
(0.0201)
-0.210***
(0.0186)
-11.44***
(0.622)

(3)
Log of Non-tax
revenue per capita
1.477***
(0.121)
0.893***
(0.116)
0.228**
(0.110)
0.909***
(0.229)
0.00909***
(0.00145)
0.170***
(0.0254)
0.193***
(0.0235)
-8.316***
(0.786)

Observations
1,843
1,843
1,843
R-squared
0.308
0.578
0.248
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variables are express in log. The US Dollar to Peruvian new sols
exchange rate on December 2014 was as 1 USD = 2.9798 new sols.
Source: Ministry of Finance, INEI
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Figure 2.1 Current and alternative methodology to distribute the FCM

Note: The box in light blue represents the proposed adjustment to incorporate fiscal capacity
in the formula.
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Table 2.9 Distribution procedure for the revenues from Canon
Share
Beneficiaries
Distribution Criteria
10%
District municipalities within which the
Equal share
natural resources are exploited
25%
Municipalities of the province within
Population and Unmet Basic
which the natural resources are exploited
Needs
40%
Municipalities of the region within
Population and Unmet Basic
which the natural resources are
Needs
exploited
25 % 80% to Regional Government of the
region, and 20% to the universities in the
region
Notes: The criteria are applicable to the revenues collected from the exploitation of mining, gas,
hydro-energetic, fishing and forest resources (excludes oil canon). The oil canon is governed by
different rules for the areas of Loreto, Ucayali, Piura, Tumbes, and Huanuco.
Source: (Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2012) and Law No. 27506 (Law on the Canon).
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Table 2.10 Equalization goals, allocation factors and international practice
Goals
Enable similar
levels of service
affordability

Factors
Expenditure needs
indicators (separately or in
a combined indicator), or
national expenditure
standards

Country examples
India, Italy, Nigeria's Federation
Account, South Africa's Equitable
Shares, Spain, Uganda's
Unconditional Grant.

Enable similar
levels of fiscal
resource
availability

Fiscal capacity
indicators or
representative revenue
system

Canada's Equalization Grant.

Enable similar
levels of service
at similar levels
of taxation

Fiscal gap = Expenditure
needs − Fiscal capacity, or
some other combination
of needs and capacity

Australia, China, Germany,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Latvia,
Russia, UK, Netherlands’
Municipal Fund, Uganda's
Equalization Grant.
Some transfers in Canada, Ecuador,
Estonia, Germany, Hungary, and
England.

Distribution on an
Population
equal per capita
basis
Source: (Boex & Martinez-Vazquez, 2007)
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Table 2.11 Estimation of per capita total revenues per district
Variables

IPpc_k

Gtoavgpck

0.563***
(0.0286)
-129.6***
(12.69)

Constant

Observations
1,819
R-squared
0.176
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.12 Disparities in local governments revenue (per capita) within and between
provinces, 2014

Square coefficient of variation (I2)
Within provinces
Between provinces
Mean log deviation (I0)
Within provinces
Between provinces
Source: Ministry of Finance.

OwnPlus
Plus other Plus
source
transfers
revenues
FCM
6.623
3.569
3.204
1.974
6.039
1.708
1.723
1.074
0.584
1.861
1.481
0.899
1.005
0.598
0.413
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0.578
0.316
0.262

0.590
0.361
0.229

0.408
0.251
0.155

Table 2.13 Changes in disparities in local governments revenue (per capita) within and
between provinces using the alternative allocations of FCM, 2014

Square coefficient of variation (I2)
Within provinces
Between provinces
Mean log deviation (I0)
Within provinces
Between provinces
Source: Ministry of Finance.

Plus FCM
1.974
1.074
0.899

Alt 2.1
1.945
1.113
0.833

Alt 2.2
1.968
1.117
0.851

Alt 2.3
1.960
1.119
0.841

Alt 2.4
1.967
1.117
0.850

0.408
0.251
0.155

0.366
0.234
0.133

0.375
0.237
0.139

0.371
0.236
0.135

0.375
0.237
0.138
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